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ARTICLES 
Thin and Thick Conceptions of the Nineteenth 
Amendment Right to Vote and Congress’s Power to 
Enforce It 
RICHARD L. HASEN* & LEAH M. LITMAN** 
This Article, prepared for a Georgetown Law Journal symposium on the 
Nineteenth Amendment’s one-hundred-year anniversary, explores and 
defends a “thick” conception of the Nineteenth Amendment right to vote 
and Congress’s power to enforce it. A “thin” conception of the Nineteenth 
Amendment maintains that the Amendment merely prohibits states from 
enacting laws that prohibit women from voting once the state decides to 
hold an election. And a “thin” conception of Congress’s power to enforce 
the Nineteenth Amendment maintains that Congress may only supply rem-
edies for official acts that violate the Amendment’s substantive guarantees. 
This Article argues the Nineteenth Amendment does more. A “thick” 
understanding of the Nineteenth Amendment’s substantive right is con-
sistent with the Amendment’s text and history, as well as with a synthetic 
interpretation of the Constitution and its expanding guarantees of voting 
rights. The thick understanding of the Nineteenth Amendment would 
allow voting-rights plaintiffs to attack restrictive voting laws burdening 
women—especially those laws burdening young women of color, who are 
also guaranteed nondiscrimination in voting on the basis of age and 
race. A thick understanding of Congress’s power to enforce the 
Nineteenth Amendment would give Congress the ability to pass laws pro-
tecting women from voter discrimination and promoting their political 
equality. The thick understanding offers a way to redeem the Amendment 
from some of its racist origins and entanglement with the sexism that lim-
ited the Amendment’s reach. It also reinforces the democratic legitimacy 
of the Constitution. Nonetheless, the current Court is unlikely to embrace 
a thick understanding of the Nineteenth Amendment.   
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INTRODUCTION 
“The Nineteenth Amendment merely gives the vote to women.”1 Justice John 
Marshall Harlan II wrote this simultaneous overstatement and understatement in 
his 1963 dissent in an early one-person, one-vote case, Gray v. Sanders. Justice 
Harlan’s claim was an overstatement because nothing in the Nineteenth 
Amendment, which prohibits denial or abridgement of the right to vote “on 
account of sex,”2 enfranchised African-American women. Despite the Fifteenth 
1. Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 386 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
2. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX. 
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Amendment’s bar on racial discrimination in voting, African-American women 
continued to face disenfranchisement, especially in the American South, until af-
ter the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.3 Indeed, the Nineteenth 
Amendment did not give any women—or men—the right to vote in elections; 
instead, it just barred discrimination in voting once a state agreed to hold an 
election.4 
Justice Harlan’s observation was an understatement because there was nothing 
“mere” about the significance of the Nineteenth Amendment’s passage. Its 1920 
ratification was the numerically largest single act of voter enfranchisement since 
the American founding, roughly doubling the voting population from only eligi-
ble men to eligible men plus women.5 
The Court decided Gray just a year after its decision in Baker v. Carr, which 
declared justiciable one-person, one-vote challenges under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.6 The year after Gray, the Court struck down unequally apportioned 
state legislative districts in Reynolds v. Sims7 and unequally apportioned congres-
sional districts in Wesberry v. Sanders.8 At issue in Gray was Georgia’s weighted 
voting system for choosing U.S. Senators and statewide officeholders.9 The 
3. See ROSALYN TERBORG-PENN, AFRICAN AMERICAN WOMEN IN THE STRUGGLE FOR THE VOTE, 
1850–1920, at 1–2 (1998) (“For black women, however, the struggle to maintain the vote continued for 
two generations after the passage of the woman suffrage amendment, as most were robbed of their 
ballots by the success of white political supremacy in the South.”); Neil S. Siegel, Why the Nineteenth 
Amendment Matters Today: A Guide for the Centennial, 27 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 235, 241–42 
(2020). Indeed, it was not just African-American women who remained disenfranchised: 
Women who could not pay a poll tax, pass a literacy test, or a “moral character” evaluation; 
American women who lost their citizenship by marrying a non-citizen man and women from 
immigrant groups barred from naturalization; and many American Indian women, via citi-
zenship denials and other avenues, were all still easily and legally excluded by state voter 
disqualifications after the Nineteenth Amendment took effect.  
CORRINE M. MCCONNAUGHY, THE WOMAN SUFFRAGE MOVEMENT IN AMERICA: A REASSESSMENT 251– 
52 (2013). 
4. Cf. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104 (2000) (“The individual citizen has no federal constitutional 
right to vote for electors for the President of the United States unless and until the state legislature 
chooses a statewide election as the means to implement its power to appoint members of the electoral 
college. . . . History has now favored the voter, and in each of the several States the citizens themselves 
vote for Presidential electors. When the state legislature vests the right to vote for President in its people, 
the right to vote as the legislature has prescribed is fundamental; and one source of its fundamental 
nature lies in the equal weight accorded to each vote and the equal dignity owed to each voter. The State, 
of course, after granting the franchise in the special context of Article II, can take back the power to 
appoint electors.” (citations omitted)). 
5. ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY IN THE 
UNITED STATES 175 (rev. ed. 2009) (“The electorate nearly doubled in size between 1910 and 1920, but 
voting patterns and partisan alignments were little affected.”); see also AILEEN S. KRADITOR, THE IDEAS 
OF THE WOMEN SUFFRAGE MOVEMENT: 1890–1920, at 29–30 (W.W. Norton & Co.1981) (1965) 
(explaining argument against enfranchising women who were also members of an undesirable class, 
political persuasion, or race: “Doubling the electorate would increase the preponderance of 
‘undesirable’ voters.”). 
6. See 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962). 
7. 377 U.S. 533, 581 (1964). 
8. 376 U.S. 1, 18 (1964). 
9. Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 372 (1963). 
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“county unit” voting system gave greater voting power to voters in rural counties 
compared to urban counties and to voters in smaller rural counties compared to 
larger rural counties.10 The Court in Gray struck down that system as an equal 
protection violation.11 
Although Gray decided the constitutional question under the Fourteenth 
Amendment, Justice Douglas’s majority opinion also relied upon a nascent thick 
understanding of the Nineteenth Amendment, situating it within the greater strug-
gle to expand voting rights in the United States: 
The Fifteenth Amendment prohibits a State from denying or abridging a 
Negro’s right to vote. The Nineteenth Amendment does the same for women. 
If a State in a statewide election weighted the male vote more heavily than the 
female vote or the white vote more heavily than the Negro vote, none could 
successfully contend that that discrimination was allowable. How then can one 
person be given twice or 10 times the voting power of another person in a 
statewide election merely because he lives in a rural area or because he lives in 
the smallest rural county?12 
Near the end of his majority opinion, Justice Douglas wrote: “The conception 
of political equality from the Declaration of Independence, to Lincoln’s 
Gettysburg Address, to the Fifteenth, Seventeenth, and Nineteenth Amendments 
can mean only one thing—one person, one vote.”13 The Court repeated this lan-
guage in Reynolds.14 
A similarly thick conception of the Nineteenth Amendment, with an emphasis 
on broad congressional enforcement power, appears in a provocative, short foot-
note in Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s dissent in the 2013 case Shelby County v. 
Holder.15 In Shelby County, the Supreme Court struck down the coverage for-
mula in section 4(b) of the Voting Rights Act, which set forth the jurisdictions 
that had to submit their voting changes for federal approval.16 The Court majority 
held that because Congress had not updated the coverage formula, the law that 
Congress had extended repeatedly (and that the Supreme Court had upheld 
repeatedly17) now violated the “equal sovereignty” of states.18 The Court 
10. Id. at 372–73. 
11. Id. at 381. 
12. Id. at 379 (citation omitted). 
13. Id. at 381. 
14. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 557–58 (1964). 
15. 570 U.S. 529 (2013); see also Richard L. Hasen, Shelby County and the Illusion of Minimalism, 
22 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 713, 728–29 (2014) (describing the footnote as offering a “muscular and 
integrated vision of the five constitutional amendments mentioning the right to vote and, coupled with 
its view of the Elections Clause in Article 4, [viewing] the Constitution [as] giv[ing] Congress broad 
power to protect the franchise and democratic processes against state encroachment”). 
16. Shelby County, 570 U.S. at 556–57. 
17. See Lopez v. Monterey County, 525 U.S. 266, 287 (1999); City of Rome v. United States, 446 
U.S. 156, 187 (1980); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 337 (1966). 
18. Shelby County, 570 U.S. at 544. 
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determined that this part of the Voting Rights Act was no longer within 
Congress’s power to enforce the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments.19 
Justice Ginsburg disagreed, finding ample congressional power in the Fifteenth 
Amendment.20 She included the following footnote, expressing the view that the 
constitutional amendments mentioning the “right to vote” gave Congress broad 
power to protect voting rights: 
The Constitution uses the words “right to vote” in five separate places: 
the Fourteenth, Fifteenth, Nineteenth, Twenty–Fourth, and Twenty–Sixth 
Amendments. Each of these Amendments contains the same broad empower-
ment of Congress to enact “appropriate legislation” to enforce the protected right. 
The implication is unmistakable: Under our constitutional structure, Congress 
holds the lead rein in making the right to vote equally real for all U.S. citizens. 
These Amendments are in line with the special role assigned to Congress in pro-
tecting the integrity of the democratic process in federal elections.21 
In contrast to this thick conception of the Fifteenth Amendment, Justice 
Harlan’s Gray dissent offered a “thin” conception of the Nineteenth 
Amendment’s right to vote.22 Rather than reading the constitutional provi-
sions concerning the right to vote to reinforce one another, Justice Harlan 
viewed each of the provisions in isolation, so that the Nineteenth 
Amendment’s enfranchisement of women had nothing to do with the enfran-
chisement of African-Americans in the Fifteenth Amendment or the right to 
equal protection in the Fourteenth Amendment. This was the context in which 
Justice Harlan recognized the “mere[]” enfranchisement of women; he 
thought that their enfranchisement had nothing to say about how courts 
should interpret voting rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.23 
Justice Harlan returned to this theme in his Reynolds v. Sims dissent, arguing 
that if the Fourteenth Amendment really protected the right to vote, the Fifteenth 
or Nineteenth Amendments would have been unnecessary.24 Each amendment 
did its work alone.25 
19. Id. at 557. For a critique of the Court’s use of the principle, see generally Leah M. Litman, 
Inventing Equal Sovereignty, 114 MICH. L. REV. 1207 (2016). 
20. Shelby County, 570 U.S. at 567 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
21. Id. at 567 n.2. 
22. See Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 382 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Reva Siegel uses the term 
“thin” in a different way: to refer to arguments that the Nineteenth Amendment affected only voting 
rights. Reva B. Siegel, She the People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality, Federalism and the 
Family, 115 HARV. L. REV. 947, 1022 (2002). “Modern sex discrimination doctrine is built on this ‘thin’ 
conception of the Nineteenth Amendment — on the assumption that the Nineteenth Amendment is a 
nondiscrimination rule governing voting that has no bearing on questions of equal citizenship for 
women outside the franchise.” Id. 
23. Gray, 372 U.S. at 385–86 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“Certainly no support for this equal protection 
doctrine can be drawn from the Fifteenth, Seventeenth, or Nineteenth Amendment.”). 
24. 377 U.S. 533, 612 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
25. Id. at 611–12 (“[U]nless one takes the highly implausible view that the Fourteenth Amendment 
controls methods of apportionment but leaves the right to vote itself unprotected, the conclusion is 
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Although Justice Harlan in his Gray and Reynolds dissents did not mention it, 
the Court’s 1937 opinion in Breedlove v. Suttles provides an even thinner view of 
the Nineteenth Amendment.26 Justice Harlan had offered a gender-neutral, for-
malist view of the Nineteenth Amendment that prohibited only laws that explic-
itly discriminate in voting on the basis of sex.27 The Court in Breedlove viewed 
the Nineteenth Amendment as doing even less: The Court’s sexist interpretation 
of the Nineteenth Amendment allowed for de jure gender discrimination in voting 
rules.28 
In Breedlove, the Court upheld a Georgia election law that imposed a poll tax 
on men and women but exempted women who declined to register to vote.29 As 
we will show,30 Breedlove, the only Supreme Court case to directly decide 
whether a state law violated the Nineteenth Amendment, drips with sexism.31 In 
1966, the Court in Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections overruled the por-
tion of Breedlove that rejected an equal protection challenge to state poll taxes.32 
As Justice Black pointed out in dissent, however, the Harper majority did not 
overrule the part of Breedlove approving gender discrimination in the application 
of the poll tax.33 The Court has never returned to the issue, leaving Breedlove to 
be at least nominally good law on the meaning of the Nineteenth Amendment 
right to vote. 
In this Article, we explore what it would mean for Congress and the Supreme 
Court to take seriously a thick conception of the Nineteenth Amendment substan-
tive right and Congress’s enforcement power as part of a constellation of amend-
ments expanding the right to vote. Part I explains where Breedlove and Justice 
Harlan’s dissents in Gray and Reynolds went wrong in adopting a thin reading of 
the Nineteenth Amendment’s voting right, and offers instead a synthetic and 
intersectional thick reading. Part II sets forth the kinds of voting rights reforms 
that Congress could pass pursuant to a thick understanding of its Nineteenth 
Amendment enforcement power, consistent with Justice Ginsburg’s thick reading 
inescapable that the Court has, for purposes of these cases, relegated the Fifteenth and Nineteenth 
Amendments to the same limbo of constitutional anachronisms to which the second section of the 
Fourteenth Amendment has been assigned.”). 
26. See 302 U.S. 277 (1937), overruled by Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1996). 
27. See Gray, 372 U.S. at 385–86. 
28. See Breedlove, 302 U.S. at 283–84. 
29. Id. 
30. See infra Part II. 
31. For a rare modern case discussing Nineteenth Amendment voting rights, see Ball v. Brown, 450 
F. Supp. 4 (N.D. Ohio 1977). The court treated the Amendment as coextensive with the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 8. 
32. 383 U.S. 663, 669 (1966). 
33. Id. at 673 (Black, J., dissenting) (“The Breedlove case upheld a poll tax which was imposed on 
men but was not equally imposed on women and minors, and the Court today does not overrule that part 
of Breedlove which approved those discriminatory provisions.”); see also id. at 669 (majority opinion) 
(overruling Breedlove only to “that extent” that it upheld a poll tax against equal protection challenge). 
Justice Harlan, joined by Justice Stewart, separately dissented in Harper. Id. at 680 (Harlan, J., 
dissenting); see also Ronnie L. Podolefsky, The Illusion of Suffrage: Female Voting Rights and the 
Women’s Poll Tax Repeal Movement After the Nineteenth Amendment, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 839, 
887 (1998) (“The issue of gender discrimination in Breedlove was left intact.”). 
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of Congress’s power to protect voting rights. This Part considers legislation 
related to voting power, political equality, and political economy. Finally, Part III 
returns to reality, explaining the likelihood that the current Supreme Court would 
reject the thick reading of Congress’s Nineteenth Amendment enforcement 
power by relying on state action and congruence and proportionality require-
ments, a narrow interpretation of “on account of” sex, and external constitutional 
constraints. 
I. JUSTIFYING A THICK READING OF THE NINETEENTH AMENDMENT 
Given the paucity of judicial interpretations and scholarly writings on the 
scope of the Nineteenth Amendment, even one hundred years after its ratification, 
we believe that its interpretation remains up for grabs in important respects. 
Interpretations of the Amendment’s scope fall on a continuum from thin readings 
(which maintain the Amendment does very little) to thick readings (which inter-
pret the Nineteenth Amendment to do more). Thin readings include the view that 
the Nineteenth Amendment provides little substantive relief from gender inequal-
ity in voting (as in Breedlove) and the gender-neutral, formalist view that Justice 
Harlan embraced in his Harper dissent. Thick readings include Justice 
Ginsburg’s view that the Amendment, together with other constitutional provi-
sions, secures more substantial voting rights under the Constitution. 
In this Part we advocate a thick interpretation of the Nineteenth Amendment’s 
substantive right. This reading recognizes that the Constitution protects against 
the perpetuation of political-power disparities on the basis of gender. The thick 
reading is gender-conscious (not gender-neutral), and it recognizes that the main 
purpose of the Amendment was originally and should continue to be read as pro-
tective against the subordination of women in U.S. politics. In this way, it rejects 
both Breedlove’s sexism and Justice Harlan’s formalism. The text and history of 
the Nineteenth Amendment and the broader struggle over voting rights and wom-
en’s equality for the last 150 years support this thick reading. 
The thick reading also protects voting rights holistically rather than in a piece-
meal fashion. In other words, the Constitution’s voting rights protections should 
be read broadly and synergistically rather than discretely focused on whether a 
voting restriction burdens age, gender, or race. Discrimination that affects groups 
of people who fall within a number of constitutionally protected classes (such as 
race, gender, and age) should be viewed as especially suspect, even if restrictive 
voting laws would fail if they had a disparate impact on people in just one of these 
categories. 
Further, as we explain in Part II, a thick reading of the Nineteenth Amendment 
includes a muscular interpretation of congressional power to protect voting rights. 
Congress can go beyond the Elections Clause (which gives it power only over 
federal elections and voting) and the Fourteenth Amendment in passing laws 
assuring greater political equality across genders and across other classes of 
people. 
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A. THIN 
To believers in the promise of a strong Nineteenth Amendment, Breedlove v. 
Suttles34 is a profound disappointment. The 1937 Breedlove opinion offers the 
Supreme Court’s most extensive application of the scope of the Amendment— 
although it is only one paragraph long35—and the opinion sadly reflects the sex-
ism of the day. The case offers the thinnest possible version of the Nineteenth 
Amendment, even thinner than what Justice Harlan offered in his Gray and 
Reynolds dissents, and future courts and constitutional scholars should reject it.36 
Nolen R. Breedlove was a twenty-eight-year-old white, male American citizen 
and resident of Georgia.37 He brought suit against a Georgia tax collector who 
would not register him to vote because Breedlove refused to pay a poll tax.38 The 
relevant Georgia statute required that every inhabitant of the state between the 
ages of twenty-one and sixty pay a poll tax of one dollar, “but that the tax shall 
not be demanded from the blind or from females who do not register for vot-
ing.”39 In other words, a sighted male or female citizen between the ages of 
twenty-one and sixty who wished to vote had to pay the poll tax before voting. 
And sighted males between twenty-one and sixty, but not females, had to pay the 
tax whether or not they registered or were even eligible to vote. 
Breedlove argued that the poll tax violated three provisions of the Constitution: 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Privileges or 
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Nineteenth 
Amendment.40 The Court rejected each of the arguments, spending the most time 
on the equal protection argument (the only part of the Breedlove decision that the 
Supreme Court reversed in the 1966 Harper case41). 
After declaring that “[t]he equal protection clause does not require absolute 
equality,” the Court stated that it would be “harsh and unjust” to require the col-
lection of a tax from those who were “too poor to pay.”42 It justified the exclusion 
of minors from the tax because a tax would burden “their fathers or others upon 
whom they depend for support.”43 It also justified the exclusion of men over the 
34. 302 U.S. 277 (1937), overruled by Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966). 
35. Id. at 283–84. 
36. On the historical reasons for the emergence of a thin Nineteenth Amendment, see Paula A. 
Monopoli, The Constitutional Development of the Nineteenth Amendment in the Decade Following 
Ratification, 11 CONLAWNOW 61, 71 (2019) (“With Congress, state legislatures and state and federal 
courts important sources of constitutional enforcement and interpretation, the suffrage movement faced 
powerful patriarchal agents that were, as a matter of institutional self-interest, likely inclined to limit the 
impact of women’s enfranchisement.”). Monopoli fleshes out this argument in PAULA A. MONOPOLI, 
CONSTITUTIONAL ORPHAN: GENDER EQUALITY AND THE NINETEENTH AMENDMENT (forthcoming 2020) 
(manuscript at 57–58) (on file with authors). 
37. Breedlove, 302 U.S. at 280. 
38. Id. 
39. Id. at 279–80 (citing GA. CODE § 92-108 (1933)). 
40. Id. at 280. Breedlove did not argue against the exemption of the blind from the poll tax 
requirement. Id. at 280–81. 
41. See supra notes 26–33 and accompanying text. 
42. Breedlove, 302 U.S. at 281. 
43. Id. 
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age of sixty on the grounds that older men were “often, if not always, excused 
from road work, jury duty and service in the militia” and many had already served 
the public before turning sixty.44 
The Court then justified the exclusion of women who declined to register to 
vote from poll tax obligations: 
The tax being upon persons, women may be exempted on the basis of special 
considerations to which they are naturally entitled. In view of burdens neces-
sarily borne by them for the preservation of the race, the State reasonably may 
exempt them from poll taxes. The laws of Georgia declare the husband to be 
the head of the family and the wife to be subject to him. To subject her to the 
levy would be to add to his burden. Moreover, Georgia poll taxes are laid to 
raise money for educational purposes, and it is the father’s duty to provide for 
education of the children. Discrimination in favor of all women being permis-
sible, appellant may not complain because the tax is laid only upon some or 
object to registration of women without payment of taxes for previous years.45 
After quickly disposing of the privileges or immunities argument,46 the Court 
offered a single paragraph analyzing and rejecting the Nineteenth Amendment 
argument.47 The Court declared that the Amendment “applies to men and women 
alike and by its own force supersedes inconsistent measures, whether federal or 
state.”48 The Court held that the provision’s purpose “is not to regulate the levy or 
collection of taxes. The construction for which appellant contends would make 
the amendment a limitation upon the power to tax.”49 Citing the long history of 
state poll taxes and declaring them a “familiar and reasonable regulation,” the 
Court held that: 
[B]y the exaction of payment before registration, the right to vote is neither 
denied nor abridged on account of sex. It is fanciful to suggest that the Georgia 
law is a mere disguise under which to deny or abridge the right of men to vote 
on account of their sex.50 
It is hard to know where to begin in describing modern objections to 
Breedlove’s analysis of the Nineteenth Amendment. The Court’s reasoning is 
short, perfunctory, and conclusory, for starters. And the little substantive analysis 
it did contain was objectionable: The Court based its equal protection analysis 
44. Id. at 281–82. 
45. Id. at 282 (citations omitted). 
46. Id. at 283 (“To make payment of poll taxes a prerequisite of voting is not to deny any privilege or 
immunity protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Privilege of voting is not derived from the United 
States, but is conferred by the State and, save as restrained by the Fifteenth and Nineteenth Amendments 





50. Id. at 283–84. 
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upon sexual stereotypes and sexist state laws that placed the husband as the head 
of the family.51 It also saw the exclusion of nonregistered women from the poll 
tax as a way to relieve a financial burden on men but failed to acknowledge the 
burden of the tax on unmarried women.52 
Implicitly gesturing toward the still-extant racial discrimination of the day, the 
Court declared that women were entitled to exemptions from some laws because 
of the “burdens necessarily borne by them for the preservation of the race.”53 
Here, the Court relied upon earlier cases, including the 1908 case, Muller v. 
Oregon, which upheld the imposition of a ten-hour maximum workday on 
women and not on men because of (white) women’s maternal burden.54 The 
Court reasoned that “as healthy mothers are essential to vigorous offspring, the 
physical well-being of woman becomes an object of public interest and care in 
order to preserve the strength and vigor of the race.”55 White women, in other 
words, were too busy bearing and raising children to vote.56 
There are other flaws in the Court’s analysis as well. The Court declared that a 
state would not violate the Nineteenth Amendment by burdening men, but not 
women, with a poll tax.57 It treated the issue of taxes on the act of voting and vot-
ing as two separate and distinct issues. But the poll tax may have effectively 
given husbands a veto over their wives’ ability to vote given the various ways 
husbands exercised financial control over their wives at the time.58 And most 
51. See id. at 282 (“The laws of Georgia declare the husband to be the head of the family and the wife 
to be subject to him. To subject her to the levy would be to add to his burden.” (citing GA. CODE § 51- 
501 (1933)). 
52. See LESLIE FRIEDMAN GOLDSTEIN, THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF WOMEN 101 (2d ed. 1988) 
(“Is there any part of Justice Butler’s reasoning [in Breedlove] that justifies exempting unmarried 
women from this tax?”). 
53. Breedlove, 302 U.S. at 282. 
54. 208 U.S. 412, 421–23 (1908). The other cases the Breedlove Court cited for this proposition were 
Quong Wing v. Kirkendall, 223 U.S. 59 (1912); Riley v. Massachusetts, 232 U.S. 671 (1914); Miller v. 
Wilson, 236 U.S. 373 (1915); and Bosley v. McLaughlin, 236 U.S. 385 (1915). Breedlove, 302 U.S. at 
282. 
55. Muller, 208 U.S. at 421. 
56. The reference to “the race” here could be read more charitably as referring to the human race 
rather than the white race, but the racism of the Court in Muller, and by extension, Breedlove, is at least 
implicit. See Katherine C. Sheehan, Toward a Jurisprudence of Doubt, 7 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 201, 247 
n.188 (1997) (“A public interest in fertility has often been asserted as a reason for special protections or 
restrictions on women’s activities. This interest is typically racist, either implicitly, see Muller, or 
explicitly. The mid-nineteenth-century campaign to restrict the availability of abortion, for example, 
was supported by arguments that the decline in white birth rates must be reversed to prevent the nation 
from being overrun by immigrants.”). 
57. It was not just sexism which caused the Court to ignore this issue of Georgia’s penalty on 
registering and voting women; it was the nature of a Nineteenth Amendment claim brought by a male 
plaintiff. See JoEllen Lind, Dominance and Democracy: The Legacy of Woman Suffrage for the Voting 
Right, 5 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 103, 205 n.511 (1994) (“Perhaps because the Court was faced with a male 
petitioner, the possibility that Georgia’s scheme actually militated against women’s right to vote was 
even more obscured.”). 
58. See Margaret J. Chriss, Troubling Degrees of Authority: The Continuing Pursuit of Unequal 
Marital Roles, 12 LAW & INEQ. 225, 227–46 (1993) (outlining various rules that solidified economic 
subordination of wives to husbands); Siegel, supra note 22, at 981–87 (same); Reva Siegel, Why Equal 
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importantly, the Court ignored the fact that imposing a poll tax only on women 
who chose to register discouraged women from voting. Women who registered to 
vote had to pay (or have others pay) the tax; women who declined to register to 
vote did not have to pay. The Georgia poll tax therefore amounted to a penalty 
upon voting women. Far from the tax and voting rights being separate, Georgia 
law tied them together and discriminated against women. 
Breedlove is not unique in failing to recognize discrimination against women. 
The Court would continue this trend over the next several decades. Goesaert v. 
Cleary upheld a Michigan statute that provided bartending licenses to women 
only if they were the wife or daughter of a man who owned a business licensed to 
sell beer.59 Hoyt v. Florida upheld the exclusion of women from jury service.60 
The Court overruled Hoyt, but not until 1975.61 And it was only around that time 
that the Court began to invalidate laws that discriminated on the basis of sex.62 
But the sexism of the 1937 opinion in Breedlove and its reliance on the pater-
nalistic reasoning in Muller is nonetheless curious. Fourteen years before 
Breedlove, the Court had rejected Muller and embraced a more formal account of 
gender equality in Adkins v. Children’s Hospital.63 Whereas Muller had upheld a 
law imposing maximum work hours on women but not men, Adkins held that 
such laws discriminated against women by denying them the same freedom to 
contract as men.64 
This “freedom of contract” idea was a relic of the Lochner era and later 
reversed as to minimum-wage and maximum-hour laws in the 1937 West Coast 
Hotel Co. v. Parrish case.65 But the 1923 Adkins opinion is still notable for its 
partial acceptance of gender equality and how it rooted that acceptance in the 
Nineteenth Amendment: 
[T]he ancient inequality of the sexes, otherwise than physical, as suggested in 
the Muller Case has continued “with diminishing intensity.” In view of the 
great—not to say revolutionary—changes which have taken place since that 
utterance, in the contractual, political, and civil status of women, culminating 
in the Nineteenth Amendment, it is not unreasonable to say that these differen-
ces have now come almost, if not quite, to the vanishing point.66 
Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 
1111, 1116–19 (1997) (same). 
59. 335 U.S. 464, 467 (1948). 
60. 368 U.S. 57, 69 (1961). 
61. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 537 (1975). 
62. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 77 (1971); see also Elizabeth Sepper & Deborah Dinner, Sex in 
Public, 129 YALE L.J. 78, 97–104 (2019) (documenting hosts of public discrimination against women 
and the movement toward public accommodations laws in the 1970s). 
63. 261 U.S. 525 (1923), overruled in part by W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). 
64. Id. at 552–53. 
65. 300 U.S. at 400. 
66. Adkins, 261 U.S. at 553 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
2020] THIN AND THICK CONCEPTIONS OF THE 19TH AMENDMENT 37 
Breedlove’s embrace of sexism, its reliance of the repudiated Muller case, and 
its decision to ignore Adkins’ more progressive view of the Nineteenth 
Amendment, moved the issue of women’s voting rights and the scope of the 
Amendment backwards. 
Justice Harlan did not perpetuate or repeat Breedlove’s sexist views in his dis-
sents in Gray v. Sanders and Reynolds v. Sims. His analysis recognized the formal 
equality of voters regardless of gender.67 But, as explained in the Introduction, 
his brief analysis minimized the Nineteenth Amendment’s significance, both as 
an act of enfranchisement and as part of a growing constellation of enfranchising 
changes to the Constitution. 
B. THICK 
Justices Douglas in his Gray v. Sanders majority opinion and Justice Ginsburg 
in her Shelby County v. Holder dissenting opinion have led the way toward a 
thicker and more robust understanding of the Nineteenth Amendment’s protec-
tion against gender discrimination in voting. Rather than viewing the 1920 
enfranchisement of women in isolation, one can trace an expansion of voting 
rights from the Declaration of Independence’s recognition that “all men are cre-
ated equal,”68 to President Abraham Lincoln’s reiteration of that principle in the 
Gettysburg Address in the midst of the Civil War struggle to end slavery of 
African-Americans, to the passage of a number of voting-related constitutional 
amendments including: the Fourteenth Amendment (imposing a penalty of repre-
sentation in the U.S. House of Representatives upon states that deny the votes to 
male, citizen, nonfelon residents), the Fifteenth Amendment (prohibiting discrim-
ination in voting on the basis of race), the Seventeenth Amendment (providing 
that voters could directly elect U.S. Senators), the Nineteenth Amendment (pro-
hibiting discrimination in voting on the basis of gender), the Twenty-Third 
Amendment (granting Washington, D.C. the power to choose presidential elec-
tors), the Twenty-Fourth Amendment (barring the use of poll taxes in federal 
elections), and the Twenty-Sixth Amendment (barring discrimination in voting 
against eighteen- to twenty-one-year-olds). 
This Part offers three reasons for embracing a thick reading of the Nineteenth 
Amendment, which would give Congress broad authority to enact laws promot-
ing political equality in voting. First, a thick reading is consistent with the text of 
the Nineteenth Amendment as well as with certain aspects of the history of the 
Amendment’s passage. One of the most significant fights over the Amendment in 
Congress was whether enfranchising women would be decided on a national or 
on a state-by-state basis. The Amendment marked the success of nationalist 
forces, which supports reading the Amendment to contain strong congressional 
enforcement power to further its aims.69 
67. See supra text accompanying notes 2–4, 22–25. 
68. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
69. We acknowledge that this thick reading is in some tension with some of the exclusivist arguments 
that some supporters of women’s suffrage made. See infra notes 71–115 and accompanying text. 
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Second, the thick reading is justified by a synthetic interpretation of the 
Constitution. Reading the amendments to the Constitution chronologically dem-
onstrates the nation’s growing commitment toward political equality and toward 
giving Congress the tools to promote it. 
Third, the thick reading reflects evolving standards of political equality, dating 
back to Supreme Court cases in the 1960s recognizing voting as a fundamental 
right for all citizen, adult resident nonfelons. It is also consistent with the long-
standing political process theory that grounds many of those Supreme Court deci-
sions.70 Despite the Court’s conservative turn, these precedents still appear to be 
firmly established judicial doctrines. 
1. Text and History 
A thick reading of the Nineteenth Amendment is consistent with its text, which 
prohibits not just denial but abridgement of the right to vote on account of sex. 
When a state passes a law that results in greater burdens on women being able to 
register and vote compared to men, a court should conclude that the law 
“abridges” the Nineteenth Amendment. Abridgment occurs when a state “dimin-
ishes” or “shortens” a voting right on account of sex. 
The Supreme Court has made this point in the analogous context of the 
Fifteenth Amendment’s prohibition of abridgement of the right to vote on 
account of race.71 At the very least, laws and procedures diminishing voting on 
the basis of gender are constitutionally impermissible. Nothing about the term 
“abridgement” suggests the term applies only to intentional discrimination.72 
Thus, the term “abridgement” is consistent with the thick reading of the 
Amendment as barring laws that have discriminatory effect on voting power on 
the basis of gender. 
The historical argument for the thicker reading of the Nineteenth Amendment 
is more complex, but it begins with this basic fact: women and men who 
supported passage of the Nineteenth Amendment believed that laws denying 
women’s full and equal participation in the political process should be 
70. See generally United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (explaining that 
judicial review should be especially searching when laws limit access to the political process); JOHN 
HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980) (same). 
71. Reno v. Bossier Par. Sch. Bd., 528 U.S. 320, 333–34 (2000) (explaining that the “core meaning” 
of the term “abridge” is “to shorten” according to two dictionaries, and that “abridging” in context of 
Fifteenth Amendment “refer[s] . . . to discrimination”); see also United States v. Alabama, 252 F. Supp. 
95, 104 n.53 (M.D. Ala. 1966) (“Significantly, the Fifteenth Amendment uses the term ‘abridged’ as 
well as ‘denied.’ Webster’s New International Dictionary defines abridged as: ‘To make shorter; to 
shorten in duration; diminish; curtail; as, to abridge a visit * * *. To deprive; to cut off;— followed by 
‘of’, and formerly by from; as, to abridge one of his rights.’ Webster’s New International Dictionary, 
Second Edition, 1959, p. 7.”); Dale Ho, Minority Vote Dilution in the Age of Obama, 47 U. RICH. L. 
REV. 1041, 1062 n.84 (2013) (quoting the Black’s Law Dictionary definition of abridge as “[t]o reduce 
or diminish”); Michael P. O’Connor, Time Out of Mind: Our Collective Amnesia About the History of 
the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 93 KY. L.J. 659, 717 (2004) (discussing nineteenth century 
dictionary and legal dictionary definitions of “abridge”). 
72. See Bossier Par. Sch. Bd., 528 U.S. at 333–34; United States v. Alabama, 252 F. Supp. at 104 
n.53; Ho, supra note 71, at 1062 n.84; O’Connor, supra note 71, at 717. 
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unconstitutional and that the national government should have broad powers to 
enforce the right contained in the Amendment when states fail to do so on their 
own accord. 
Members of Congress and ratifying state legislatures understood the 
Amendment as granting full, equal political rights to at least white women. 
Indeed, Zornitsa Keremidchieva’s analysis of the debates contemporaneous to 
the passage of the Nineteenth Amendment shows that Congress focused less on 
whether women were entitled to equal voting rights than on whether this question 
was better resolved at the state or national level.73 Congress rejected an amend-
ment that would have left the power to enforce the Amendment in the hands of 
the states.74 
The complexity arises because some supporters of women’s suffrage, mostly 
in the last decade before the ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment,75 
advanced their cause by opposing the voting rights of other groups, particularly 
African-Americans. Although this reality arguably undermines a broad synthetic 
reading of voting rights in the Constitution, it is important not to hold supporters 
of women’s suffrage to a higher standard than other political movements whose 
principles are reflected in the Constitution, and whose aims were also infected 
with racism. As Ellen Carol DuBois writes, “every other white-dominated popu-
lar political movement of that era similarly accommodated to insurgent white su-
premacy. And yet only the woman suffrage movement—not the Gilded Age 
labor movement or the People’s Party or even Progressivism itself—has been so 
fiercely criticized for the fatal flaw of racism.”76 Those movements produced 
principles that have been divorced from their racist underpinnings and racist limi-
tations, and the movement that agitated for the passage of the Nineteenth 
Amendment can do the same. 
Equally important, Reva Siegel has argued that the Women’s Suffrage 
Movement began with claims for universal human rights and human suffrage, 
even though some wings of the Movement subsequently embraced the period’s 
racism.77 For example, early suffrage proponents Elizabeth Cady Stanton and 
Susan B. Anthony, on behalf of the Women’s Loyal National League, organized 
a petition that collected almost half a million signatures demanding emancipa-
tion.78 
See Letter from E. Cady Stanton, President, and Susan B. Anthony, Sec’y, The Women’s Loyal 
Nat’l League, to the Women of the Republic (Jan. 25, 1864) (supporting the abolition of slavery), 
https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/resources/pdf/WomensLoyalNationalLeague.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/CKE3-U54T]. 
As Siegel’s historical analysis suggests, the history of the Nineteenth 
73. Zornitsa Keremidchieva, The Congressional Debates on the 19th Amendment: Jurisdictional 
Rhetoric and the Assemblage of the US Body Politic, 99 Q.J. SPEECH 51, 55 (2013). 
74. Steve Kolbert, The Nineteenth Amendment Enforcement Power (but First, Which Is the 
Nineteenth Amendment, Again?), 43 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 507, 544–45 (2016); see also infra notes 243– 
65 and accompanying text. 
75. ELLEN CAROL DUBOIS, SUFFRAGE: WOMEN’S LONG BATTLE FOR THE VOTE 3–4 (2020). 
76. Id. at 4. 
77. Reva B. Siegel, The Nineteenth Amendment and the Democratization of the Family, 129 YALE L. 
J.F. 450, 456–62 (2020). 
78. 
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Amendment began with antebellum efforts for universal equality, including racial 
equality.79 
It is nonetheless worth noting that when the Nineteenth Amendment was rati-
fied, the promotion of women’s suffrage sometimes led to denigrating the suf-
frage prospects of others. We cannot ignore this history even as we argue later in 
this Article toward a more intersectional, holistic approach to voting rights. The 
struggle for women’s suffrage was never easy. Aileen Kraditor in her key history 
of the woman’s suffrage movement reports that, “The early pioneers for women’s 
rights were subjected to humiliation and occasional violence. . . . No rights were 
handed to them on a platter; they fought long and hard for every victory they won 
down to and including the Nineteenth Amendment.”80 In 1875, the Supreme 
Court in Minor v. Happersett rejected the argument that the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s recognition of the privileges and immunities bestowed upon all 
citizens conferred equal voting rights on women in the United States.81 
After that defeat, supporters of women’s suffrage began a decades-long strug-
gle to pass a constitutional amendment guaranteeing women the right to vote.82 
Sometimes that fight led women’s suffrage supporters to make questionable alli-
ances and to advance now-unpalatable arguments to aid in the movement’s 
progress. 
Corrine McConnaughy recently explored the complex passage of the 
Nineteenth Amendment, which required coalitional politics.83 The path to ratifi-
cation, which began in the states decades before the ratification of the Nineteenth 
Amendment, did not follow the “strategic enfranchisement” model through 
which African-Americans achieved formal enfranchisement.84 Under the strate-
gic enfranchisement model, Republicans at the end of the Civil War supported 
granting blacks voting rights “anticipating that the party could profit from its 
claim as the liberator of the country’s slave population by reaping the votes of 
these new citizens. Blacks were seen as a promising voting bloc, one the 
Republicans sorely needed, especially to have any electoral hope in the readmit-
ted Confederate states.”85 
According to McConnaughy, the strategic enfranchisement model could not 
work for women’s enfranchisement because of the commonly held belief that 
women would follow the leads of their husbands in voting, with the expectation 
that the number of votes would double without causing a shift in partisan 
79. See Siegel, supra note 77, at 460–63. 
80. KRADITOR, supra note 5, at xiv. 
81. 88 U.S. 162, 171 (1875) (“It is clear, therefore, we think, that the Constitution has not added the 
right of suffrage to the privileges and immunities of citizenship as they existed at the time it was 
adopted.”). For an argument that women suffragists were early “living constitutionalists” in asking for 
the Fourteenth Amendment to guarantee women’s suffrage, see Adam Winkler, A Revolution Too Soon: 
Women Suffragists and the “Living Constitution,” 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1456, 1458 (2001). 
82. For an excellent history, see generally DUBOIS, supra note 75. 
83. MCCONNAUGHY, supra note 3, at 10. 
84. Id. at 34–35 & 35 n.19. 
85. Id. at 253–54. 
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politics.86 These predictions initially turned out to be correct, despite the later 
emergence of a “gender gap” between men and women.87 As states began to en-
franchise white women in the early twentieth century, each state’s partisan politi-
cal alignment remained mostly the same.88 McConnaughy argues that women’s 
suffrage supporters instead followed a “programmatic enfranchisement” model: 
“changes in state laws came when suffragists could build coalitions with groups 
able to leverage for their cause from inside party politics; woman suffrage was 
delivered by politicians as part of a program of policies meant to appease their 
existing constituents.”89 
Supporters of women’s suffrage allied themselves with other groups, such as 
farmers, in an effort to build on existing interest-group power to push for changes 
in voting laws.90 Women’s suffrage was not the top agenda item for these other 
interest groups, but they were happy to have the additional support and help to-
ward electoral viability and, in turn, supported women’s suffrage.91 Given the 
middle- and upper-class white base of the Women’s Suffrage Movement,92 some 
coalitions proved harder to forge, such as with labor unions and, in some places,93 
with supporters of enfranchisement rights for nonwhites.94 
Among the most important coalitionist activities of women’s suffragists was to 
ally with minor political parties. These parties, which typically held only a few 
seats in state legislatures, often affected the balance of power within states and 
influenced the eventual policy positions of the major parties.95 
This same pattern of third-party influence emerged on the national scale. The 
decades-long effort to convince Congress to pass a constitutional amendment 
86. See id. at 11. This argument is in some tension with the idea that women would help to enforce 
prohibition, because they were more likely to support morals legislation, and the later argument that 
women would support Jim Crow as the price for southern support for women’s suffrage. 
87. DANIEL HAYS LOWENSTEIN ET AL., ELECTION LAW—CASES AND MATERIALS 43 n.f. (6th ed. 
2017). 
88. MCCONNAUGHY, supra note 3, at 11. 
89. Id. at 10, 252; see also id. at 215–16, 249–50. 
90. See id. at 252–53. 
91. Id. at 258. 
92. It was a mostly white, middle-class women’s movement, but, as Rosalyn Terborg-Penn has 
shown, African-American (also mostly middle-class) women also played an important, underreported 
role in the struggle for the right to vote, fighting “racism and sexism simultaneously.” TERBORG-PENN, 
supra note 3, at 2; see also generally Liette Gidlow, The Sequel: The Fifteenth Amendment, The 
Nineteenth Amendment, and Southern Black Women’s Struggle to Vote, 17 J. GILDED AGE & 
PROGRESSIVE ERA 433 (2018) (describing the suffrage struggles of black women in the South between 
the 1870s and 1920s). 
93. MCCONNAUGHY, supra note 3, at 222, 253; see also KRADITOR, supra note 5, at xiv (“Although 
working-class, Negro, and foreign-born women received the vote along with the rest, the suffrage 
movement was essentially from beginning to end a struggle of white, native-born, middle-class women 
for the right to participate more fully in the public affairs of a society the basic structure of which they 
accepted.”). 
94. MCCONNAUGHY, supra note 3, at 206, 208, 219–20. 
95. Id. at 210 (“Nine of the fifteen full woman suffrage adopter[] [states] and six of fifteen 
presidential or primary suffrage adopter[] [states] acted after an election in which the reform party 
garnered more than 5 percent of the gubernatorial vote.”). 
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barring discrimination in voting on the basis of gender finally bore fruit.96 
President Teddy Roosevelt, who had not been an early supporter of women’s suf-
frage, became a supporter when he ran again as a candidate for president in 1912 
as part of the Bull Moose Party.97 As this new progressive party started to organ-
ize, it allied with other organizations, including organizations supporting wom-
en’s suffrage, to build political power.98 Roosevelt lost the 1912 presidential 
election to Woodrow Wilson, but the push for women’s suffrage survived. By 
1916, both the Democratic and Republican Party platforms endorsed the exten-
sion of the franchise to women (although through state-based decisions, not via a 
constitutional amendment).99 
The Women’s Suffrage Movement had the hardest time using coalitional poli-
tics in geographic areas where they could not form partnerships with other 
groups, a problem most common in the American South.100 It is not as though 
Southerners were more opposed to women’s suffrage compared to the rest of the 
country. Instead, there was great concern that allowing women’s voting rights on 
a national scale could open up the system to effective re-enfranchisement of 
African-Americans, which Southern senators strongly opposed.101 
MCCONNAUGHY, supra note 3, at 245–46; see also Kimberly A. Hamlin, How Racism Almost 
Killed Women’s Right to Vote, WASH. POST (June 4, 2019, 6:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
outlook/2019/06/04/how-racism-almost-killed-womens-right-vote/. 
By this point 
in history, African-American voters had been effectively disenfranchised 
throughout the South, and preserving that status quo was the paramount aim of 
Southern politicians.102 Further, Southern states generally had stricter election- 
and ballot-access rules to block African-American voting, and these rules also 
made it harder for women’s suffrage supporters to engage in political action to 
assure nondiscrimination in voting on the basis of gender.103 
Partially in an appeal for Southern support, some women’s suffrage activists 
pitted themselves against those fighting for African-American and others’ voting 
rights. Although women’s suffrage pioneer Susan B. Anthony “believed in uni-
versal suffrage on the theory that women, Negroes, propertyless workers, and 
96. See id. at 247–48. 
97. Id. at 238–39. 
98. Id. 
99. Id. at 244. The Democratic party platform recommended “the extension of the franchise to the 
women of this country, State by State, on the same terms as to the men,” and the Republican party 
“favor[ed] the extension of the suffrage to women, but recogniz[ed] the right of each State to settle 
this question for itself.” Id. On the changing coalitional politics that led to conditions for the passage 
of the Amendment, see KEYSSAR, supra note 5, at 173–75. 
100. MCCONNAUGHY, supra note 3, at 250 (“The result was that states with large non-white 
populations often presented nearly impossible political challenges for suffragists — no matter how large 
suffrage organization memberships and budgets grew.”); see also KRADITOR, supra note 5, at xv 
(“The Southern [women’s] suffragist movement was a white women’s movement, and the participation 
of Southern individuals and organizations in [the National American Woman Suffrage Association] 
signified a permanent break with the abolitionist tradition from which the women’s right agitation had 
sprung.”). 
101. 
102. See KEYSSAR, supra note 5, at 173–75; MCCONNAUGHY, supra note 3, at 244, 251–52; Siegel, 
supra note 3, at 7–8; TERBORG-PENN, supra note 3, at 1–2. 
103. MCCONNAUGHY, supra note 3, at 208–09. 
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naturalized citizens had the same inalienable right to consent to the laws they 
objected as did white, rich, and native-born men,” over time some supporters of 
women’s suffrage were willing to cast aside support for African-American 
suffrage—sometimes even embracing racist arguments—to assure women’s suf-
frage on the state and national levels.104 These later women’s rights supporters 
“unanimously believed that the stability of government depended on the rule of 
the ‘intelligent’ portion of the population, and so they could easily see the consis-
tency of decreasing the political power of ‘unfit’ groups with increasing their 
own.”105 
Keremidchieva demonstrated that the congressional debates contemporaneous 
with the Nineteenth Amendment’s passage reflected an understanding that the 
right of (white) women to vote would not lead to rights for noncitizens and for 
African-American women and men. “[E]arly in the debate Sen. Williams (D-MS) 
introduced an amendment calling for the term ‘white’ to be inserted before the 
word ‘person’ in the resolution.”106 Williams was an opponent of the Nineteenth 
Amendment, and his proposal was defeated.107 
Despite Southern resistance, the Amendment mandating women’s suffrage 
rights on a national scale gained the reluctant support of President Wilson during 
World War I and enough momentum to pass in Congress.108 But it is “wildly 
inaccurate” to think of women’s enfranchisement in the United States as happen-
ing in a single episode with the Amendment’s approval.109 By the time of the 
Amendment’s ratification in 1920, “woman suffrage in some form was already a 
reality in nearly every state. Thirty states had changed their laws to do away with 
sex qualifications to vote in elections of national consequence.”110 Many of the 
senators voting in favor of the Amendment did so because of the support in their 
states for women’s suffrage, as demonstrated by earlier state-enfranchisement  
104. KRADITOR, supra note 5, at 163, 165 (“Southern white women began building a suffrage 
movement the principal argument of which was that the enfranchisement of women would insure the 
permanency of white supremacy in the South.”). 
105. Id. at 164; see also Rabia Belt, Outcasts from the Vote: Women’s Suffrage and Mental 
Disability 4 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors) (“Using techniques from petitions to 
posters, elite white woman suffrage activists applied mental disability to leverage their privilege in order 
to gain the franchise. They countered the images of female lunatics deployed by anti-suffragists, 
homogenized the image of white women as able-minded, and offered these able-minded white women 
to able-minded white men as allies and a bulwark against a potential menace of enfranchised mentally 
impaired men.”). 
106. Keremidchieva, supra note 73, at 58. 
107. See id.; Kolbert, supra note 74, at 543 n.201. 
108. See DUBOIS, supra note 75, at 211–12, 222–29 (discussing Wilson’s reluctance); id. at 244 
(discussing Wilson’s final capitulation after years of protests during World War I); KEYSSAR, supra note 
5, at 173–74 (discussing the connection between the war effort and the Women’s Suffrage Movement). 
109. MCCONNAUGHY, supra note 3, at 251. 
110. Id. States did so “either by striking the word male from the suffrage clauses of their state 
constitutions, or by amending state law to remove the sex qualification for presidential electors or 
primary voters.” Id. 
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efforts.111 Ultimately, the Nineteenth Amendment passed without much support 
from Southern senators112 and without ratification in Southern states.113 
Scholars continue to debate the racism of the later Women’s Suffrage 
Movement,114 and the extent to which the tactics embraced by some in the Movement 
reflected the views of suffrage supporters generally. In the end, the Women’s 
Suffrage Movement proved successful enough that (white) women quickly gained the 
franchise where it had not already been granted by a state. Others who were denied 
the franchise had to wait decades more to achieve full voting rights. The Nineteenth 
Amendment barely needed judicial review because few states directly discriminated 
against white women in voting, whereas discrimination against African-American 
men and women returned many times to the courts, often with embarrassingly little 
done about it until after the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.115 
2. Synthetic Interpretation 
As the last section demonstrated, the text of the Nineteenth Amendment as 
well as its history indicate that its drafters and supporters intended to give the 
national government a key role in ensuring equal voting rights regardless of gen-
der. The Amendment mandated gender equality in voting on a national scale, 
with federal protection and congressional enforcement power to be wielded 
against resisting states. Less clear from that history is support for our argument 
that the Nineteenth Amendment should be read more broadly as part of a general 
expansion of voting rights in the United States. Indeed, some of the history points 
toward a kind of gender exclusivism, which rejected concerns about voting laws 
discriminating against other groups. 
We advance the argument for a holistic and broad approach by looking syn-
thetically at the Constitution,116 viewing the Nineteenth Amendment as one of a 
111. Id. at 243. 
112. Id. 
In the end, enough senators, including a few from below the Mason-Dixon Line, voted “yes” 
on the Susan B. Anthony Amendment for it to pass on June 4, 1919. Senators approved the 
amendment not because they thought it would enfranchise women of color or compel the 
enforcement of the 15th Amendment, but because they knew it would not.  
Hamlin, supra note 101. 
113. KEYSSAR, supra note 5, at 175. 
114. Marjorie Julian Spruill, Race, Reform, and Reaction at the Turn of the Century; Southern 
Suffragists, the NAWSA, and the “Southern Strategy” in Context, in VOTES FOR WOMEN: THE STRUGGLE 
FOR SUFFRAGE REVISITED 102, 102 (Jean H. Baker ed., 2002). 
115. See Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 560–63 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); South 
Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 310–17 (1966). 
116. Here, we follow Reva Siegel and others in “approach[ing] the Constitution as a charter of 
government forged in history by successive generations of authors and emphasiz[ing] the ways that they 
modified the Constitution’s meaning by amending the document over time.” Siegel, supra note 22, at 
967 & n.54. Synthetic readings of the Constitution differ from “intratextualism,” which “urges a reader 
interpreting ‘a contested word or phrase that appears in the Constitution; to consider its meaning as it 
appears in other passages.” Michael T. Morley, The Intratextual Independent “Legislature” and the 
Elections Clause, 109 NW. U. L. REV. ONLINE 131, 135 (2015) (quoting Akhil Reed Amar, 
Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 748 (1999)). 
2020] THIN AND THICK CONCEPTIONS OF THE 19TH AMENDMENT 45 
number of important amendments expanding the right to vote in the United States 
and Congress’s enforcement powers, and looking at the Supreme Court’s history 
of expanded voting rights. The thick reading recognizes that the Constitution’s 
voting rights protections should be read broadly and synergistically rather than 
focusing discretely on whether a voting restriction burdens age, gender, or race. 
Imagine a state law imposing especially high burdens on the voting rights of 
young women of color. Such a law could require voting to take place only during 
ten hours on Election Day and offer no early or no-excuse absentee voting, de-
spite evidence that young women of color are most likely among the voting popu-
lation to have difficulty in voting given work and childcare obligations. A thick, 
synthetic reading of the Nineteenth Amendment would recognize that these vot-
ers’ rights are also protected by the Fourteenth, Fifteenth, and Twenty-Sixth 
Amendments, and find such a law unconstitutional. 
This is not to say that such laws would be unconstitutional only if they bur-
dened people who fit in all three categories. But courts should be especially sensi-
tive to laws imposing disproportionate political burdens on people potentially 
facing discrimination for multiple reasons. 
The text of the Nineteenth Amendment, read in the context of the entire 
Constitution and especially the other amendments protecting voting rights, sup-
ports the thick reading. This reading could provide a basis not only for a lawsuit 
attacking the state’s failure to offer meaningful alternatives to Election Day vot-
ing, but also for congressional legislation mandating that states offer early or no- 
excuse absentee voting, even in state and local elections.117 
We are not the first to suggest that the Nineteenth Amendment should be read 
synthetically and in a thick way. In a famous 2002 article, She the People: The 
Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality, Federalism, and the Family, Professor 
Reva Siegel argued that the passage of the Nineteenth Amendment strengthened 
the scope of equal protection rights contained in the earlier-ratified Fourteenth 
Amendment.118 “When Americans finally voted to ratify the Nineteenth 
Amendment, they were breaking with understandings of the family that had 
organized public and private law and defined the position of the sexes since the 
founding of the republic.”119 Her “synthetic reading” of the Fourteenth and 
Nineteenth Amendments 
would bring to the interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause a knowledge 
of the family-based status order through which women were disfranchised for 
most of this nation’s history and from which they were emancipated after over 
a half century of struggle. Interpreted from this sociohistoric standpoint, a core 
117. No doubt Congress would have the power under the Elections Clause to require such 
opportunities in elections with federal candidates on the ballot. See Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of 
Ariz., 570 U.S. 1, 8–9 (2013). 
118. Siegel, supra note 22, at 952. For an originalist argument following Siegel’s lead, see Steven G. 
Calabresi & Julia T. Rickert, Originalism and Sex Discrimination, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1, 12–13, 67–68 
(2011) (describing where the authors agree and disagree with Siegel’s analysis). 
119. Siegel, supra note 22, at 951. 
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meaning of equal protection for women is freedom from historic forms of sub-
ordination in the family.120 
Our argument is much narrower than Siegel’s because it is focused specifically 
on the question of voting and political rights contained in the Constitution, and 
not, for example, on issues of family law. 
In a nutshell, no one reading the Constitution and its amendments in chrono-
logical order could miss the progression in favor of expanded voting rights. At 
the time of the original Constitution, there was no direct election of the U.S. 
Senate121 until the passage of the Seventeenth Amendment in 1913 and the 
Electoral College gave state legislatures broad powers to choose the manner of 
selecting presidential electors.122 The Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments pro-
hibited discrimination in voting on account of race; the Seventeenth Amendment 
provided for the direct election of senators; the Nineteenth Amendment prohib-
ited discrimination in voting on account of sex; the Twenty-Third Amendment 
effectively enfranchised Washington, D.C. residents to vote for President; the 
Twenty-Fourth Amendment prohibited poll taxes; and the Twenty-Sixth 
Amendment assured that voters as young as eighteen years old would not face 
discrimination in voting. Each of these steps expanded voting rights, and no 
amendments have ever constricted them. 
It is easy to imagine a litigation strategy premised on a revived Nineteenth 
Amendment within the scope of a cluster of new voting rights claims. Indeed, 
although Nineteenth Amendment litigation has been virtually nonexistent, paral-
lel arguments recently have emerged in terms of potential state violations of the 
Twenty-Sixth Amendment barring discrimination in voting on the basis of age. 
Eric Fish has argued that the Amendment “should be interpreted to protect voters 
of all ages from age discrimination, not merely the young. It should also be inter-
preted to permit Congress to enact legislation overriding state policies that 
abridge voting rights on the basis of age, even if such discrimination is not those 
policies’ main purpose.”123 
Yael Bromberg notes that thus far, most courts have avoided deciding whether 
the Twenty-Sixth Amendment has its own legal force when plaintiffs allege that 
120. Id. at 952; see also Joseph Fishkin, Equal Citizenship and the Individual Right to Vote, 86 IND. 
L.J. 1289, 1344 (2011) (“The Nineteenth Amendment . . . . overturned the hollow conception of the 
political meaning of citizenship at the heart of Minor—the proposition that while ‘citizens’ might have 
some civil rights, in terms of politics they are nothing more than subjects who happen to reside in a 
republic.”). 
121. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1. 
122. U.S. CONST. amend. XVII. State legislators retain the power to directly choose presential 
electors even as all states have allowed voters to choose. See supra note 4. Franita Tolson has argued 
that the Elections Clause gives Congress broad power to regulate elections. See Franita Tolson, The 
Spectrum of Congressional Authority over Elections, 99 B.U. L. REV. 317, 321 (2019). 
123. Eric S. Fish, Note, The Twenty-Sixth Amendment Enforcement Power, 121 YALE L.J. 1168, 
1172 (2012); see also Symm v. United States, 439 U.S. 1105, 1105 (1979) (mem.) (summarily affirming 
the district court, which struck down a law burdening college-student voters as a violation of the 
Twenty-Sixth Amendment). 
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they face burdens as young voters.124 She also argues that courts need to think 
more creatively about the standard under the Twenty-Sixth Amendment and 
should pay particular attention when age discrimination in voting overlaps with 
discrimination on the basis of race and partisanship.125 
3. Supreme Court Precedent 
Beginning in the 1960s, the Supreme Court’s constitutional voting rights juris-
prudence began to recognize this expansion of voting rights. The Court has come 
a long way since it rejected the right to women’s suffrage under the Fourteenth 
Amendment in the 1875 case Minor v. Happersett;126 tolerated Southerners’ con-
tinued disenfranchisement of African-Americans in 1903 with Giles v. Harris127 
and whites-only political primaries in 1935 under Grovey v. Townsend;128 and 
accepted poll taxes in the 1937 Breedlove v. Suttles129 case and literacy tests in 
1959 through Lassiter v. Northampton County Board of Elections.130 
But two decades later, the Court reversed Grovey, holding that whites-only pri-
maries violate the Constitution.131 And beginning in the 1960s, the Court’s 
greater protection for voting rights took hold. As noted in the Introduction, the 
Court in a series of cases created and applied the one-person, one-vote rule to fed-
eral, state, and local elections.132 The Court partially reversed Breedlove and 
struck down poll taxes on equal protection grounds in the 1966 Harper case.133 
The Court established voting as a fundamental right, rendering most citizen, 
adult, resident nonfelons eligible to vote in local and state elections.134 It struck 
down long durational-residency requirements135 and oppressive ballot access 
rules.136 And in dealing with the formerly intractable problem of continued 
Southern resistance to the Fifteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court upheld 
Congress’s power under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to pass key 
124. Yael Bromberg, Youth Voting Rights and the Unfulfilled Promise of the Twenty-Sixth 
Amendment, 21 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1105, 1111–12 (2019). 
125. Id. at 1113–15. 
126. 88 U.S. 162, 171 (1875). 
127. 189 U.S. 475, 476 (1903). 
128. 295 U.S. 45, 55 (1935), overruled in part by Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944). Before 
Grovey, the Court at first sidestepped the question of the white primary’s constitutionality in Newberry 
v. United States, 256 U.S. 232 (1921), and then struck down white primaries in Nixon v. Herndon, 273 
U.S. 536, 541 (1927) and Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73, 89 (1932). 
129. 302 U.S. 277, 284 (1937), overruled by Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 
(1966). 
130. 360 U.S. 45, 53–54 (1959). 
131. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 470 (1953); Smith, 321 U.S. at 666. 
132. See supra notes 1–14 and accompanying text. The extension to local elections occurred in Avery 
v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474, 481 (1968). 
133. Harper, 383 U.S. at 666–69. 
134. See Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419, 424–26 (1970); Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 
395 U.S. 621, 632–33 (1969); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 96 (1965). The exception is for special- 
purpose units of government. See Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 
719, 733 (1973). 
135. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 360 (1972). 
136. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 34 (1968). 
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provisions of the 1965 Voting Rights Act,137 including a nationwide ban on liter-
acy tests.138 The Voting Rights Act has been the most important step toward 
effective enfranchisement of African-American men and women voters in 
American history.139 
The current Supreme Court has been unwilling to further extend voting 
rights.140 In 2013, it struck down the coverage formula in the Voting Rights Act 
because it held that Congress acted unconstitutionally in relying on old data.141 In 
2019, it refused to recognize a standard for policing partisan gerrymandering.142 
But the much more conservative judicial body has not touched any of the Warren 
Court-Era precedents expanding the right to vote. When the Court returned to 
one-person, one-vote issues in the Evenwel v. Abbott case, which raised the ques-
tion whether the one-person, one-vote standard requires drawing districts with 
equal numbers of voters or citizens, only Justice Thomas suggested revisiting the 
earlier precedents and allowing states to draw districts with unequal popula-
tions.143 The Warren Court-Era voting rights cases seem firmly established even 
in the hands of a much more conservative Supreme Court. 
That these cases have endured for more than half a century despite the more 
conservative turn of the Supreme Court demonstrates the strong commitment to 
expanded political equality under the Constitution. The cases begin with the sup-
position that all eligible voters are entitled to an equal vote that will be fairly 
counted, and that distinctions among groups of voters will be subject to strict 
scrutiny. Together, the cases support the thick reading of the Nineteenth and other 
voting Amendments, along with broad congressional power to enforce such rights 
through appropriate legislation. 
II. CONGRESS’S THICK NINETEENTH AMENDMENT ENFORCEMENT POWER 
Some work advancing gender equality in politics can occur at the state level: 
States can pass laws seeking to equalize political power across genders. Other 
work could be done in the courts: Individuals or entities could bring lawsuits 
challenging state and local voting restrictions as violating the Nineteenth 
Amendment and potentially other voting-related Amendments. But some states 
137. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 337 (1966); see also supra note 19 and 
accompanying text (describing Court’s continued recognition of congressional power to impose 
preclearance under the Voting Rights Act until the Shelby County decision). 
138. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 131–34 (1970). 
139. See LOWENSTEIN ET AL., supra note 87, at ch. 5 (analyzing Voting Rights Act cases and issues of 
minority voting rights). 
140. For a look at the Roberts Court’s record on voting rights in its first decade, see Richard L. 
Hasen, Election Law’s Path in the Roberts Court’s First Decade: A Sharp Right Turn But with Speed 
Bumps and Surprising Twists, 68 STAN. L. REV. 1597 (2016). 
141. Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 557 (2013). 
142. Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2508 (2019). 
143. 136 S. Ct. 1120, 1133 (2016) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“I write separately because this Court 
has never provided a sound basis for the one-person, one-vote principle.”). Justice Alito also concurred 
separately expressing caution, id. at 1142 (Alito, J., concurring), but did not go as far as Justice Thomas 
and did not join Justice Thomas’s concurrence. 
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will not act, and some courts will not view the Nineteenth Amendment’s substan-
tive protections broadly enough. In such an instance, Congress may act to ensure 
greater political equality across genders. Inevitably, the question will arise 
whether Congress has exceeded its powers in passing such legislation. Congress 
already has broad authority to set rules for federal elections under the Elections 
Clause.144 We believe courts and scholars should embrace a thick conception of 
Congress’s enforcement power contained in Section 2 of the Nineteenth 
Amendment to allow Congress to act even more broadly in the areas of state and 
local elections and to go beyond direct enfranchisement and towards laws that 
equalize political power across genders more broadly. 
Justice Ginsburg in her Shelby County dissent emphasized the congressional 
enforcement powers contained in many of the amendments expanding the fran-
chise.145 Like several of the preceding amendments (and in particular, the 
Reconstruction Amendments), the Nineteenth Amendment contains both a sub-
stantive provision and a grant of power to Congress.146 The Nineteenth 
Amendment Enforcement Clause also similarly gives Congress the “power to 
enforce this article by appropriate legislation.”147 Justice Ginsburg wrote that 
these Amendments are “in line with the special role assigned to Congress in pro-
tecting the integrity of the democratic process in federal elections.”148 
A thick reading of the Nineteenth Amendment’s voting right could justify 
broad federal voting rights legislation as well as more generally applicable legis-
lation promoting political equality regardless of gender. This Part offers a 
glimpse of how Congress might exercise its powers under the Nineteenth 
Amendment. 
There are several different reasons to think—and theories that explain—why 
Congress has the power to prohibit state laws or policies that might not violate 
the Nineteenth Amendment’s substantive provision. We will refer to this as a 
“thick” conception of Congress’s enforcement power (similar to the “thick” con-
ception of the right to vote). Some of these theories have been—or could be— 
applied to the preceding Reconstruction Amendments; the fact that they have not 
is an important reason to doubt that the modern Court would adopt a thick con-
ception of Congress’s powers under the Nineteenth Amendment. Part III explains 
the various obstacles that a thick conception of Congress’s enforcement powers 
would likely encounter; this Part, however, explores what a thick conception of 
Congress’s enforcement powers might look like, and some reasons to prefer that 
conception. 
144. Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., 570 U.S. 1, 8–9 (2013). 
145. Justice Ginsburg did not mention the Seventeenth Amendment, which lacks any congressional 
enforcement mechanism, and neither Justice Douglas nor Justice Ginsburg mentioned the Twenty-Third 
Amendment. 
146. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIX. 
147. U.S. Const. amend. XIX, § 2. 
148. Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 567 n.2 (2013). 
50 THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 108:27 
One thick conception of the Enforcement Clause views the Clause as remedial 
and primarily backward looking,149 allowing Congress to remedy past discrimina-
tion on the basis of sex and sex inequality. Some of the gender disparities that 
exist today are vestiges of the regime that the Nineteenth Amendment (partially) 
dismantled—a regime in which women were not allowed to vote and were 
viewed as unfit for public and political life.150 
See Siegel, supra note 22, at 977–93. Women still face political-power disparities, even as 
women’s voter turnout has equaled or exceeded men’s turnout in recent U.S. elections, especially 
among younger voters. CTR. FOR AM. WOMEN & POL., GENDER DIFFERENCES IN VOTER TURNOUT 
(2019), https://www.cawp.rutgers.edu/sites/default/files/resources/genderdiff.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
WKW3-78Z3]. 
Congress’s enforcement power 
might conceivably allow Congress to eliminate the lingering effects of that re-
gime in order to prevent preexisting gender disparities from compounding. For 
example, to the extent that certain social norms about what makes a successful 
political leader are informed by who has been a political leader in the past, 
Congress might be able to combat those perceptions, which may be driven, in 
part, by the history of sex discrimination.151 
Another interpretation of Congress’s enforcement power would look to the 
way that the Court has interpreted the Eleventh Amendment and the principle of 
state sovereign immunity it reflects (but does not exhaust). The Eleventh 
Amendment, by its terms, prohibits the federal courts from hearing cases between 
a state and a citizen of another state.152 But the Court has interpreted the Eleventh 
Amendment to reflect a broader principle of state sovereign immunity that pro-
hibits the federal and state courts from hearing cases between a state and its citi-
zens.153 The Court has also held that the state sovereign immunity principle 
prevents Congress from subjecting states to suits in state or federal court under its 
power to regulate interstate commerce.154 The Court has justified this principle by 
asserting that the Eleventh Amendment prohibited only one specific type of suit 
that was foremost on Americans’ minds at the time; the Amendment purportedly 
addresses the prototypical case implicating state sovereign immunity, but the 
Amendment applies more broadly than that specific example.155 
One could imagine a similar approach to the Nineteenth Amendment.156 That 
is, the substantive provision of the Nineteenth Amendment might address one 
particular manifestation of the sex disparities that existed at the time while 
149. This theory comports with City of Boerne’s focus on the remedial nature of the Enforcement 
Clause language. See infra notes 251–71 and accompanying text. 
150. 
151. See infra notes 229–30 and accompanying text (discussing electability problems that female 
candidates encounter). 
152. U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
153. See Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt, 139 S. Ct. 1485, 1490 (2019); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 
U.S. 1, 21 (1890). 
154. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712 (1999); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 
53 (1996). 
155. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 723; Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 69–70. We do not mean to endorse the 
Court’s interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment, but rather to demonstrate an instance in which the 
Court expanded the reach of an amendment beyond its text and toward a broader principle. 
156. Reva Siegel’s article takes a similar approach. See Siegel, supra note 22, at 1046. 
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reflecting a more far-reaching principle, at least under the Enforcement Clause 
(such that Congress could prohibit additional forms of discrimination).157 
Another interpretation of Congress’s enforcement power views the power as a 
backstop to judicial enforcement of the Constitution. Judicial doctrines implement-
ing the Constitution imperfectly identify conduct that violates the Constitution. 
The tiers of scrutiny, for example, create some false positives (by invalidated 
laws under heightened scrutiny when the laws do not offend the Constitution) as 
well as some false negatives (by upholding laws under only minimal scrutiny 
when the laws do violate the Constitution).158 Other doctrinal apparatuses also 
imperfectly capture constitutional substance. For example, the Court has held 
that facially neutral laws amount to unconstitutional discrimination only where 
the laws are motivated by a discriminatory purpose.159 The doctrine’s focus on 
legislative intent creates the risk that judges might lack the pertinent fact-finding 
capabilities to conclude that a state actor had an impermissible purpose.160 
Judges’ deference to the political branches might also lead them to err on the 
side of upholding laws.161 
Congress’s capacity to legislate beyond the substantive provisions of the 
Nineteenth Amendment compensates for these realities. Congress can con-
clude that some restrictions on voting amount to impermissible discrimination 
on the basis of sex. That is, Congress can reach a conclusion even if federal 
courts could not and should not reach that same conclusion based on the judi-
cial doctrines that limit judges’ implementation of substantive constitutional 
guarantees.162 Congress also has fact-finding capabilities and is able to draw 
lines that might seem arbitrary on the margins but nonetheless distinguish 
between laws that are different in important respects.163 
Congress’s enforcement power might also be a vehicle for legislative constitu-
tionalism and departmentalism. Departmentalism is the idea that other branches 
of government besides the federal courts interpret the Constitution.164 Legislative 
constitutionalism is one particular manifestation of this idea—where Congress 
157. The Eleventh Amendment, of course, contains only a substantive prohibition. 
158. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1966 Term—Foreword: Implementing the 
Constitution, 111 HARV. L. REV. 54, 83–88 (1997) (arguing that doctrinal rules implement substantive 
constitutional guarantees and only imperfectly capture them); Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermuele, 
Emergencies and Democratic Failure, 92 VA. L. REV. 1091, 1131–33 (2006) (similar). 
159. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 248 (1976). 
160. E.g., Abbott v. Perez, 138 S. Ct. 2305, 2313 (2018) (upholding voting restriction that had 
disparate effects). 
161. Id. at 2315–16 (implying that the district court erred by failing to defer to Texas legislature). 
162. This principle, too, was arguably reflected in Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966). In 
that case, the Court allowed Congress to prohibit a voting test (a literacy test) that the Court had 
previously upheld against a facial challenge under the Fourteenth Amendment. See Lassiter v. 
Northampton Cty. Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 53–54 (1959). 
163. See Caitlin E. Borgmann, Rethinking Judicial Deference to Legislative Fact-finding, 84 IND. 
L.J. 1, 4 (2009) (“[T]here is a widely accepted view that legislative bodies are better than courts at fact- 
finding.”). 
164. See Kevin C. Walsh, Judicial Departmentalism: An Introduction, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
1713, 1715 (2017). 
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makes a constitutional determination.165 As Reva Siegel and Robert Post 
explained with reference to the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress’s enforcement 
power might authorize Congress to arrive at a different conclusion than the fed-
eral courts about whether any particular law violates the Constitution, or even 
about the meaning of a particular substantive guarantee in the Constitution.166 
Post and Siegel elaborated on why, as a matter of constitutional governance and 
democratic legitimacy, the Constitution would assign Congress this power— 
particularly with respect to rights-reinforcing legislative powers.167 And Michael 
McConnell, among others, has explained why, as a matter of history, the public 
that ratified the Fourteenth Amendment would have wanted Congress to be on 
the forefront of enforcing the amendment’s substantive guarantees, rather than 
the federal courts.168 Given that the Nineteenth Amendment uses the same lan-
guage as the Fourteenth Amendment, it may embody a similar principle.169 
Another conception of Congress’s enforcement power maintains that Congress 
can adopt prophylactic measures that prevent future constitutional violations. 
Katzenbach v. Morgan arguably reflected this understanding of Congress’s 
enforcement powers under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.170 In that 
case, the Court allowed Congress to prohibit the state of New York from subject-
ing anyone educated in Puerto Rico to literacy tests as preconditions to voting. 
Although the Court had previously upheld a similar literacy requirement,171 the 
Court explained that reinforcing citizens’ ability to vote might prevent the state 
from denying them social services or civic access in the future—and thus deter 
future constitutional violations.172 
For purposes of the Nineteenth Amendment, these prophylactic or preventative 
measures might have several different orientations. One would be to address bur-
dens (in addition to voter-access restrictions or voter-identification requirements) 
that might contribute to burdens on voting for women. Consider, for example, 
recent research by Jamila Michener, which has shown that individuals who obtain 
Medicaid coverage or health insurance are more likely to vote than people who 
are uninsured.173 To the extent there are aspects of social citizenship (like health 
165. See Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism and Section Five Power: 
Policentric Interpretation of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 112 YALE L.J. 1943, 1947 (2003). 
166. See id. at 1946–66, 2026–32. 
167. Id. at 2026–32. 
168. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Institutions and Interpretation: A Critique of City of Boerne 
v. Flores, 111 HARV. L. REV. 153, 156 (1997). 
169. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 (“The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate 
legislation, the provisions of this article.”); U.S. CONST. amend. XIX, § 2 (“Congress shall have power 
to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.”). 
170. 384 U.S. 641, 658 (1966). City of Boerne v. Flores, of course, changed Katzenbach’s standard 
of review. 521 U.S. 507, 527–28 (1997); see also infra notes 250–62. But City of Boerne appears to 
endorse this interpretation of Katzenbach. See 521 U.S. at 527–29. 
171. Lassiter v. Northampton Cty. Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 53–54 (1959). 
172. Katzenbach, 384 U.S. at 651–58. 
173. See generally JAMILA MICHENER, FRAGMENTED DEMOCRACY: MEDICAID, FEDERALISM, AND 
UNEQUAL POLITICS (2018). 
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insurance) that facilitate political participation, Congress could reduce impedi-
ments to voting by reducing barriers to social citizenship. Another approach to 
preventing future constitutional violations would be to address preemptively 
ways in which women’s political participation could be impeded. For example, 
eliminating economic barriers to political participation might have the effect of 
safeguarding women’s political participation and preventing future constitutional 
violations. Some scholars have questioned whether the staggering costs of elec-
tions (and the reality that large amounts of money appear to garner political influ-
ence) deter citizens from voting.174 If that is correct, then eliminating or 
attempting to combat that impediment to voting might also be a way of enforcing 
the Nineteenth Amendment.175 
Finally, a thick conception of Congress’s enforcement power provides an im-
portant mechanism for the possibility of a Second Reconstruction, but for sex 
equality,176 which could make the Nineteenth Amendment deeper and longer last-
ing. As the previous Part recounted, voting rights for African-Americans were 
not realized until almost a century after the Reconstruction Amendments, when 
Congress enacted the Voting Rights Act.177 Since the Nineteenth Amendment 
was ratified, elections have also become more democratic and the franchise has 
expanded significantly.178 That is partially because the Supreme Court recognized 
the one-person, one-vote principle and invalidated various antidemocratic laws 
and policies,179 and because the Constitution has been amended to expand the 
number of eligible voters.180 These developments mean that many of the groups 
who stood to benefit from the Nineteenth Amendment (black women, younger 
women, and women in more urban areas, among other groups) are only now in a 
position to make claims that sound in the Amendment. 
The same is true of the Amendment’s (albeit limited) promise of sex equality. 
When the Amendment was ratified, the country had certainly not rid itself of dis-
crimination on the basis of sex. At the time, people expected women to vote like 
their husbands, and many of them did so.181 Some of the arguments for suffrage  
174. See Bertrall L. Ross II, Addressing Inequality in the Age of Citizens United, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1120, 1166–70 (2018). 
175. This is not to say that the Nineteenth Amendment alone would displace all of constitutional 
antidiscrimination law, or that any law that conceivably affects political power could be justified as an 
exercise of Nineteenth Amendment powers. But laws that more directly allow for women’s full 
participation in the political process should be within Congress’s power to enforce the Amendment. This 
would be true, for example, about the Violence Against Women Act. See infra note 244. 
176. Reva Siegel helpfully raises the need for this Second Reconstruction. Reva B. Siegel, The 
Pregnant Citizen, From Suffrage to the Present, 108 GEO. L.J. 19TH AMEND. SPECIAL EDITION 167 
(2020); see also Siegel, supra note 77. 
177. See supra text accompanying notes 2–4. 
178. See supra text accompanying notes 126–43. 
179. See supra text accompanying notes 1–14. 
180. See supra text accompanying note 69. 
181. See supra text accompanying note 5. 
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even centered around the idea that women would remain in the home.182 The 
country was still in the grips of these regressive notions about sex (in addition to 
race). The continued acceptance of sexism may (partially) explain why there 
has never been any congressional legislation attempting to enforce the 
Nineteenth Amendment. But in the last several decades, there have been signif-
icant advances in sex equality.183 Congressional enforcement offers a way out 
and a way forward—a path to moving beyond the societal expectations and 
shared understandings that limited the reach of the Nineteenth Amendment and 
that contributed to cramped judicial interpretations of it. A thick notion of con-
gressional enforcement also offers a deeper grounding for the democratic legit-
imacy of the Constitution by enabling congressional protection of voting rights 
and legislative solidification of sex equality. 
Whatever the precise theory, however, the point is that many different concep-
tions of Congress’s enforcement power would allow Congress to legislate in 
ways other than providing remedies for conduct that violates the Nineteenth 
Amendment. For the remainder of this Part, we survey how this thick conception 
of Congress’s enforcement power might work: Congress’s enforcement power 
might conceivably allow it to address restrictions on voting that disproportion-
ately burden women; and prevent other impediments to women’s political 
equality. 
A. VOTING EQUALITY 
To enforce the Nineteenth Amendment’s substantive provision, Congress 
might enact legislation that eliminates obstacles to women voting. Short of pro-
hibiting women from casting votes (or discounting women’s votes), states some-
times enact preconditions to voting that have the effect of prohibiting some 
women from voting, or making it more difficult for them to do so. Some precon-
ditions to voting might limit people’s ability to vote on account of sex because 
they rely on proxies for sex or correlates with sex.184 For example, state laws pre-
viously allowed only property owners to vote.185 When state laws prohibited 
women from holding property, that precondition prohibited women from 
voting.186 
182. See 58 CONG. REC. 80, 88 (1919) (arguing that suffrage would not change women’s traditional 
role in the home); 52 CONG. REC. 1436 (1915) (“If women vote, it will not destroy the home. It only 
means a short time, once or twice a year, to go to the polls and deposit a marked piece of paper, and 
during these few minutes she wields a power that is doing more to protect her home and all other homes 
than any other possible influence, and she need not neglect her household nor her children in order to do 
it. Almost any woman has enough time to go to the polls, and enough time to inform herself so she can 
vote intelligently.”); Robert B. Jones, Defenders of “Constitutional Rights” and “Womanhood”: The 
Antisuffrage Press and the Nineteenth Amendment in Tennessee, 71 TENN. HIST. Q. 46, 60 (2012) 
(highlighting similar arguments made in Tennessee). 
183. Sepper & Dinner, supra note 62, at 97–128 (discussing advances against public discrimination 
on the basis of sex). 
184. See City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204, 206–07 (1970). 
185. Id. 
186. Id.; see Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Corruption Temptation, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 25, 31 (2014). 
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But there are also modern preconditions that impede women’s ability to vote, 
which Congress might restrict under its enforcement power. Steve Kolbert pio-
neered the idea that Congress might legislate to address modern voting precondi-
tions under its Nineteenth Amendment enforcement powers.187 He argued that 
Congress’s Nineteenth Amendment enforcement powers could target restrictive 
voting laws that disproportionately fall upon women, including voter-identification 
laws, documentary-proof-of-citizenship requirements, improper voter-registration 
database maintenance practices, and cutbacks in voting access.188 Until recently, 
Kolbert observed, “the extent to which these restrictions on voting may dispropor-
tionately affect women had gone largely unnoticed.”189 
The Nineteenth Amendment might be used not only to attack the constitution-
ality of some of these restrictive laws, but also to provide the predicate for con-
gressional legislation eliminating state restrictions. Consider the case of strict 
state voter-identification laws, which may disproportionately burden women vot-
ers for a few reasons.190 Women change their names more frequently than men 
when they get married.191 As a result, women will need to obtain updated identifi-
cation documents before voting more frequently than men, which imposes a bur-
den on women who would like to vote. Even if women do obtain the updated 
identification documents, they might still be prevented from voting to the extent 
the states voter-registration lists have not been updated to reflect their changed 
names.192 
Voter-identification laws may also disproportionately burden women because 
of socioeconomic disparities in the United States. It is no secret that women pos-
sess less wealth than men;193 they receive less money for doing similar work,194 
Valentia Zarya, Female Founders Got 2% of Venture Capital Dollars in 2017, FORTUNE (Jan. 
31, 2018, 7:30 AM), https://fortune.com/2018/01/31/female-founders-venture-capital-2017/; Claire 
Zillman, The Fortune 500 Has More Female CEOs Than Ever Before, FORTUNE (May 16, 2019, 6:30 
AM), https://fortune.com/2019/05/16/fortune-500-female-ceos/. 
and several predominantly female occupations are plagued by underpayment and 
wage theft.195 
For a long time, domestic work was specifically not covered by the federal wage laws. See Fair 
Labor Standards Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-718, 52 Stat. 1060 (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 213 
Courts have recognized that the burden of voter-identification laws 
187. See Kolbert, supra note 74. 
188. Id. at 508–29, 543–59; see also DUBOIS, supra note 75, at 5 (“Today’s voter suppression is the 
contemporary manifestation of the opposition to extending the franchise to African Americans and 
women.”). 
189. See Kolbert, supra note 74, at 511. 
190. Id. at 511–16. 
191. See Elizabeth F. Emens, Changing Name Changing: Framing Rules and the Future of Marital 
Names, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 761, 785–89 (2007). 
192. Kolbert, supra note 74, at 523 (“[W]omen are particularly vulnerable to problems related to 
database-matching: a database that lists a woman under her maiden name may report a non-match 
against the woman’s married name in the voter registration database (or an outdated voter registration 
record may not match up with an updated driver’s license or social security database).”). Further, 
counsel in Florida voting rights litigation reported voting “problems for married women who hadn’t 
changed their name on Social Security or DMV information.” Id. 
193. See, e.g., Maria Cancian & Deborah Reed, Family Structure, Childbearing, and Parental 
Employment: Implications for the Level and Trend in Poverty, 26 FOCUS 21, 24 tbl.1 (2009). 
194. 
195. 
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https://time.com/5626156/domestic-workers-anti-discrimination-law-ndwa 
[https://perma.cc/J4VH-NNNB]. 
“will fall most heavily on the poor,” in part because wealthier individuals may be 
more likely to have drivers’ licenses and individuals with greater wealth may also 
find it easier to obtain the required documentation.196 Plaintiffs’ claims against 
these laws should rely at least partially on the Nineteenth Amendment. Further, 
by eliminating these state laws, Congress would be eliminating voting barriers 
that differentially affect people on account of sex. 
Voter-roll maintenance systems are another obstacle that may disproportion-
ately burden women’s ability to vote. Voter-roll maintenance occurs when states 
remove persons from the voter rolls, ostensibly to ensure that voter rolls are up- 
to-date.197 The National Voter Registration Act requires officials to perform 
voter-list maintenance to remove ineligible voters from voter registration.198 
Some states remove voters because there is no record of the person voting in a 
recent election.199 Other times, states may eliminate a voter from the voter rolls 
when the voter-registration list contains a name that does not match a name on 
the state’s other identification lists (such as DMV lists).200 Indeed, the Help 
America Vote Act requires states to verify the names on the voter-registration 
database with other databases in order to verify voters’ identity.201 That method 
may disadvantage women who change their names after getting married.202 The 
voter purges and voter-roll maintenance system may also have differential socio-
economic burdens, similar to voter-identification laws. Getting back on the voter- 
registration list may require administrative hurdles that are particularly difficult 
for persons in lower-paying jobs with less flexible work schedules. And there is 
no question that states occasionally (and perhaps quite frequently) mistakenly 
eliminate voters from voter rolls—some estimates have suggested that Florida 
improperly removed almost 20,000 voters from voter-registration rolls.203 
See Katie Sanders, Bill Nelson Compares Rick Scott’s Voter Purge with a 2000 Attempt, 
POLITIFACT FLA. (June 5, 2012 4:02 PM), https://www.politifact.com/factchecks/2012/jun/05/bill- 
nelson/bill-nelson-compares-rick-scotts-voter-purge-2000-/ [https://perma.cc/K2H7-Q965]; see also 
David Margolick et al., The Path to Florida, VANITY FAIR (Oct. 2004), at 310–11, https://archive. 
vanityfair.com/article/2004/10/the-path-to-florida. 
Another estimate found that Ohio’s proposed list of voter purges would have mis  
(2018)). They are still not covered by civil rights laws on the workplace. See Madeleine Joung, Domestic 
Workers Aren’t Protected by Anti-Discrimination Law. This New Bill Would Change That, TIME (July 
15, 2019, 12:04 PM), 
196. Texas v. Holder, 888 F. Supp. 2d 113, 140 (D.D.C. 2012), vacated on other grounds by 570 U.S. 
928 (2013) (mem.). 
197. See Naila S. Awan, When Names Disappear: State Roll-Maintenance Practices, 49 U. MEM. L. 
REV. 1107, 1108–09 (2019). 
198. 52 U.S.C. § 20507(c)(2)(A) (2018). 
199. See, e.g., Husted v. A. Philip Randolph Inst., 138 S. Ct. 1833, 1838, 1848 (2018) (upholding 
Ohio’s ability to eliminate voters from the voter rolls where the voter did not vote in the most recent 
election and failed to return a form to the state). 
200. See Kolbert, supra note 74, at 523–24. 
201. 52 U.S.C. § 21083(a)(5). 
202. See supra note 191 and accompanying text. 
203. 
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takenly removed 40,000 voters.204 
See Nicholas Casey, Ohio Was Set to Purge 235,000 Voters. It Was Wrong About 20%., N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 14, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/14/us/politics/ohio-voter-purge.html. 
(Ohio’s mistakes were identified only because 
volunteers checked the state’s proposed list of ineligible voters.205) 
Laws that restrict access to voting (by limiting early or absentee voting or 
reducing the number of polling places) may also disproportionately burden 
women. These laws result in abridgments on voting rights on account of sex for 
similar reasons why voter-identification laws do. The restrictions may be felt 
more severely among those with less socioeconomic power, who find it harder to 
make additional time to wait in line at the polls or to take time off to vote.206 
Because women are less socioeconomically well-off than men, these restrictions 
may burden women more than men.207 Moreover, women frequently undertake a 
greater proportion of work around the house, including child care and what 
Elizabeth Emens calls “life admin,” relative to men.208 That work may be more 
difficult to set aside (or opt out of) in order to overcome various barriers to voting. 
The longer the trip to the polling place, the longer it takes to vote. Long trips com-
bined with a narrower time window in which to vote will make voting more diffi-
cult for people in charge of family care (which is less flexible than a job that 
offers days off). 
Two pieces of the Nineteenth Amendment’s history help to put into focus why 
eliminating these kinds of barriers to voting is a way of ensuring that voting will 
not be abridged “on account of sex.” Some states used fears of voter fraud to 
restrict women’s access to voting. In 1807, the New Jersey legislature prohibited 
women from voting on the ground that it would prevent voter fraud.209 Today, 
some Republican-controlled states routinely recite an interest in preventing 
extremely rare voter fraud as a justification for enacting voter-identification 
requirements and for restricting absentee or early voting—restrictions that dispro-
portionately burden women.210 
More importantly, the voting restrictions discussed above have disparate racial 
effects as well as disparate effects based on sex; voter-identification laws and 
restrictions on access to voting disproportionately hurt racial minorities.211 
Interpreting the Nineteenth Amendment to give Congress the power to remedy 
204. 
205. Id. 
206. For a description about how socioeconomic disparities in voting are a political problem, see 
Ross II, supra note 174, at 1151–52. 
207. See supra notes 191–93 and accompanying text. 
208. Elizabeth F. Emens, Admin, 103 GEO. L.J. 1409, 1433–39, 1440–41 (2015); see also Naomi 
Cahn, The Power of Caretaking, 12 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 177, 181–82 (2000); Nancy E. Dowd, 
Fatherhood and Equality: Reconfiguring Masculinities, 45 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1047, 1053–54 (2012). 
209. Act of Nov. 16, 1807, 1807 N.J. Laws 33; see also Jan Ellen Lewis, Rethinking Women’s 
Suffrage in New Jersey, 1776-1807, 63 RUTGERS L.J. 1017, 1022–23 (2011). 
210. See, e.g., Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 195–96 (2008); N.C. State 
Conference of NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 235 (4th Cir. 2016); RICHARD L. HASEN, ELECTION 
MELTDOWN: DIRTY TRICKS, DISTRUST, AND THE THREAT TO AMERICAN DEMOCRACY ch. 1 (2020). 
211. See, e.g., Ben Pryor et al., Voter ID Laws: The Disenfranchisement of Minority Voters?, 134 
POL. SCI. Q. 63, 68 (2019). 
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voting restrictions that disproportionately hurt racial minorities (black women in 
particular) is a way of redeeming the Nineteenth Amendment from the racist his-
tory with which it is entangled. As we have described,212 some of the suffragists 
who agitated for women’s right to vote were concerned with white women’s abil-
ity to vote; many of the most prominent women in the Movement as the 
Nineteenth Amendment neared ratification were content to exclude black women 
from their movement and from the ambit of the Movement’s concern.213 
See ALAN P. GRIMES, THE PURITAN ETHIC AND WOMAN SUFFRAGE 124–25 (1967); Brent 
Staples, How the Suffrage Movement Betrayed Black Women, N.Y. TIMES (July 28, 2018), https://www. 
nytimes.com/2018/07/28/opinion/sunday/suffrage-movement-racism-black-women.html; Tammy L. 
Brown, Celebrate Women’s Suffrage, but Don’t Whitewash the Movement’s Racism, ACLU (Aug. 24, 
2018, 5:45 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/womens-rights/celebrate-womens-suffrage-dont-whitewash- 
movements-racism [https://perma.cc/52PQ-85BA]. For work documenting the contributions of black 
women to suffrage, see generally TERBORG-PENN, supra note 3. 
Indeed, 
some of the arguments for the Nineteenth Amendment were that white women 
would help to maintain racial subordination and Jim Crow (and many white 
women did).214 
Interpreting the Nineteenth Amendment, and in particular Congress’s enforce-
ment power, in a way that allows Congress to transcend the racist ideologies of 
the Amendment’s contemporaries is an important part of legitimating the 
Amendment and constitutional governance. An analogy here is helpful: The 
Fourteenth Amendment has been interpreted as an aspirational guarantee that 
secures protections beyond the racist practices and racist views of its ratifiers 
(many of whom embraced segregated schools, among other invidious laws).215 
Interpreting Congress’s enforcement power under the Nineteenth Amendment to 
allow Congress to address the unique burdens faced by black women is a way of 
reinforcing the substantive and democratic legitimacy of the amendment itself. It 
allows the Amendment to function as a guarantee that protects women of color in 
addition to white women, and as a tool for Congress to rectify the burdens dispro-
portionately experienced by these women. 
212. See supra notes 73–114 and accompanying text. 
213. 
214. Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277, 282 (“In view of burdens necessarily borne by them for the 
preservation of the race, the State reasonably may exempt them from poll taxes.”), overruled by Harper 
v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966). Supporters also argued that women would impose 
traditional values on politics. 58 CONG. REC. 80 (1919); Holly J. McCammon & Karen E. Campbell, 
Winning the Vote in the West: The Political Successes of the Women’s Suffrage Movements, 1866-1919, 
15 GENDER & SOC’Y 55, 58 (2001). 
215. See Michael C. Dorf, Integrating Normative and Descriptive Constitutional Theory: The Case 
of Original Meaning, 85 GEO. L.J. 1765, 1803–05 (1997); Michael C. Dorf, The Aspirational 
Constitution, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1631, 1648 (2009). For work exploring the Fourteenth 
Amendment ratifiers’ embrace of racist ideologies and practices, see generally Siegel, supra note 58 
(exploring the post-Civil War embrace of “civil” rights in contrast to continued denials of “social” 
rights), and Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Originalism, and Constitutional Theory: A Response to 
Professor McConnell, 81 VA. L. REV. 1881 (1995) (arguing that Brown v. Board of Education cannot be 
justified on an originalist interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
2020] THIN AND THICK CONCEPTIONS OF THE 19TH AMENDMENT 59 
B. POLITICAL EQUALITY AND POLITICAL ECONOMY 
Another way for Congress to enforce the Nineteenth Amendment would be 
eliminating obstacles to women’s political equality—including obstacles to other 
exercises of political power besides voting. 
Some elements of political power relate to the political economy of voting and 
elections. There is no dearth of scholarship (or concern) about the relationship 
between money and politics. Donating money to a candidate can facilitate access 
to a lawmaker—and provide the potential to sway or influence them (even if the 
money, as such, is not the influence).216 As Larry Lessig has written, only a small 
number of people possess the kind of money that would allow them to single- 
handedly inject themselves (or a particular candidate) into federal politics.217 
Guy-Uriel Charles has described this issue in terms of “the structural and eco-
nomic barriers that preclude a vast majority of citizens from participating in poli-
tics or from financing elections”;218 through its method of financing elections, 
“the state has created a barrier for political participation (wealth) that some citi-
zens will never be able to overcome.”219 In this framing, spending money is an as-
pect of political participation akin to voting.220 Along these lines, Ryan Scoville’s 
recent study of ambassadorships has shown how, over the last few decades, 
ambassadors have been selected in part based on their campaign contributions.221 
In this context, at least, money buys political opportunities. 
As the preceding section noted, the vast majority of people who possess the 
kind of wealth that opens up these political opportunities are men.222 If Congress 
sought to ensure women’s ability to participate in politics on equal terms as men, 
216. GENE M. GROSSMAN & ELHANAN HELPMAN, SPECIAL INTEREST POLITICS 10–11 (2001); 
ROBERT G. KAISER, SO DAMN MUCH MONEY: THE TRIUMPH OF LOBBYING AND THE CORROSION OF 
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 297 (2009) (outlining the view that donors give money to “reinforce 
established connections”); Larry Makinson, What Money Buys, in SHADES OF GRAY: PERSPECTIVES ON 
CAMPAIGN ETHICS 171, 181 (Candice J. Nelson et al. eds., 2002). The ABA Task Force Report on 
Lobbying refers to “a self-reinforcing cycle of mutual financial dependency.” Am. Bar Ass’n, Task 
Force on Federal Lobbying Laws, Lobbying Law in the Spotlight: Challenges and Proposed 
Improvements, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 419, 451 (2011). For a description of how legislators can influence 
policy, short of legislation and roll call votes, see Richard L. Hasen, Fixing Washington, 126 HARV. L. 
REV. 550, 566–67 (2012) (reviewing LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST: HOW MONEY CORRUPTS 
POLITICS — AND A PLAN TO STOP IT (2011) and JACK ABRAMOFF, CAPITOL PUNISHMENT: THE HARD 
TRUTH ABOUT WASHINGTON CORRUPTION FROM AMERICA’S MOST NOTORIOUS LOBBYIST (2011)). 
217. Lawrence Lessig, What an Originalist Would Understand “Corruption” to Mean, 102 CALIF. L. 
REV. 1, 18 (2014). 
218. Charles, supra note 186, at 34 & n.37 (citing Spencer Overton, The Donor Class: Campaign 
Finance, Democracy, and Participation, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 73 (2004)). 
219. Id. at 34 
220. Id. at 35. This idea is consistent with the Court’s First Amendment cases that equate spending 
money with (political) speech. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 360 (2010); see also 
McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185, 192 (2014) (conflating campaign donors with “constituents,” and 
remarking that “ingratiation and access . . . . embody a central feature of democracy—that constituents 
support candidates who share their beliefs and interests, and candidates who are elected can be expected 
to be responsive to those concerns” (citation and internal quotations omitted)). 
221. Ryan M. Scoville, Unqualified Ambassadors, 69 DUKE L.J. 71, 109–18 (2019). 
222. Think about the billionaires who run for President—Steyer, Perot, Schultz, Bloomberg. 
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then Congress might enact a few different kinds of legislation to address the polit-
ical economy of elections and politics. These might include some of the reforms 
that scholars have proposed, including public funding of elections, or laws that 
provide voters with monetary vouchers to give to candidates.223 Other related pro-
posals include restrictions on the amount of money that any one person can give 
in an election, through any medium.224 These laws address political participation 
and political power by leveling up and leveling down the playing field 
respectively. 
Another way of addressing the disparities in political economy would be to 
address the underlying economic disparities themselves. If the reason why 
women lack political power is partially because they do not have access to the 
same kind of wealth that men do, then laws that seek to ensure equal economic 
opportunities for women might advance women’s political equality. These might 
include prohibitions on pay discrimination or other forms of sex discrimination in 
the workplace,225 as well as prohibitions against pregnancy discrimination.226 
These laws might not eliminate the wealth gap between men and women, but 
they might mitigate ways that the economic disparities between men and women 
are entrenched over time. 
Congress might also address some of the root causes of the disparities in politi-
cal economy. Some of the disparities in pay between men and women may be at-
tributable to lingering sex stereotypes and antiquated notions of gender roles that 
undermine women’s success in the workplace.227 
See, e.g., Kate Manne, Warren Succeeded Because Voters Saw Her as Caring. That’s Also Why 
She Failed., WASH. POST (Mar. 6, 2020, 9:57 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/warren- 
succeeded-because-voters-saw-her-as-caring-thats-also-why-she-failed/2020/03/06/8064b7c2-5f0f-11ea- 
b014-4fafa866bb81_story.html (citing studies that indicate that men are deemed more competent and 
likeable in the workplace). 
Laws trained at rooting out 
these stereotypes (such as laws mandating equal parental or family-care leave for 
men and women228) might enforce women’s political equality by challenging 
stereotypes that contribute to inequality. 
These stereotypes affect more than just the political economy aspects of politi-
cal equality. They may also limit women’s ability to obtain and exercise political 
power. Concerns about electability often dog female candidates more than their 
male counterparts, and they may make it harder for women to succeed in poli-
tics.229 
See Amelia Thomson-DeVeaux, Americans Say They Would Vote for a Woman, But . . ., 
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (July 15, 2019), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/americans-say-they-would-vote- 
for-a-woman-but/ [https://perma.cc/E95U-YPDA] (highlighting common stereotypes of female 
Female candidates are criticized for being too knowledgeable or not 
223. Hasen, supra note 216, at 580; Richard L. Hasen, Is ‘Dependence Corruption’ Distinct from a 
Political Equality Argument for Campaign Finance Laws? A Reply to Professor Lessig, 12 ELECTION L. 
J. 305, 311–12 (2013); Lessig, supra note 217, at 18. 
224. Lessig, supra note 217, at 19. 
225. See 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a)(1) (2018) (prohibiting employment discrimination because of sex). 
226. See Id. § 2000e(k) (including pregnancy in the definition of “because of sex” or “on the basis of 
sex” under the antidiscrimination statute). 
227. 
228. See Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2612 (2012). 
229. 
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informed enough, whereas similar traits in male candidates are written up as char-
acter features and elements of their character appeal.230 Combating these stereo-
types may be a way of ensuring women have similar political power and 
opportunities to exercise political power as men. 
The political economy of elections is not the only other aspect of political par-
ticipation that Congress might reach under its enforcement power. There are other 
avenues for political participation beyond voting, donating to campaigns, or lob-
bying those who are in political office—such as serving on a jury. The jury is a fo-
rum for citizens to have input into the criminal process and a mechanism for self- 
governance.231 In part for these reasons, some early state cases relied on the 
Nineteenth Amendment to invalidate state restrictions on women serving on 
juries.232 (Some state laws made all persons eligible to vote eligible for jury 
service.233) Although the Supreme Court later grounded that principle in the 
Fourteenth Amendment, rather than the Nineteenth Amendment,234 the state deci-
sions on jury service underscore the idea that political participation extends 
beyond the ballot box. 
Congress might enforce gender equity in political participation by reducing 
obstacles to these other forms of political participation. Consider, for example, 
that some courthouses apparently lack spaces to allow breastfeeding mothers to 
breast pump, which states then use as a reason to dismiss breastfeeding mothers 
from jury service.235 
Judith P. Miller, My Attempt at Jury Duty Failed — Because I’m a Nursing Mother, CHI. TRIB. 
(Oct. 13, 2017, 10:17 AM), https://www.chicagotribune.com/opinion/commentary/ct-perspec-jury- 
duty-breastfeeding-1015-story.html. Some states give mothers the option of postponing jury duty 
service if they are breastfeeding. See Cuomo Signs Legislation That Exempts Breastfeeding Mothers 
from Jury Duty, WKBW (Oct. 21, 2019, 12:14 PM), https://www.wkbw.com/news/local-news/cuomo- 
signs-legislation-that-exempts-breastfeeding-mothers-from-jury-duty [https://perma.cc/D2PA-DCUS]. 
Congress’s ability to reach other aspects of political participation besides voting 
and areas that are adjacent to political equality is bolstered by the combined force 
of the Nineteenth and Fourteenth Amendments.236 The Nineteenth Amendment, in 
conjunction with the Fourteenth Amendment, solidifies Congress’s power to dis-
mantle gender hierarchies outside the specific context of voting because the 
Fourteenth Amendment is not limited to issues of political equality—it encom-
passes social equality and civic equality as well.237 And the Constitution 
candidates and using statistics to show that female candidates are at a disadvantage as a result of 
stereotypes). 
230. See id. 
231. See Jocelyn Simonson, The Criminal Court Audience in a Post-Trial World, 127 HARV. L. REV. 
2173, 2195–202 (2014). 
232. See People v. Barltz, 180 N.W. 423, 425 (Mich. 1920); Parus v. Dist. Court of Fourth Judicial 
Dist. of Nev., 174 P. 706, 708 (Nev. 1918). 
233. The Supreme Court relied on similar reasoning to invalidate a restriction used to disenfranchise 
a black man. See Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370, 389 (1880). 
234. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 146 (1994). 
235. 
236. See generally Michael Coenen, Combining Constitutional Clauses, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1067 
(2016) (exploring different ways that combination analysis can be used in constitutional law). 
237. See Siegel, supra note 58, at 1131 (documenting the evolution to encompassing social equality 
within the Fourteenth Amendment rather than just civic equality). 
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specifically prevents discrimination on the basis of only three characteristics 
(race, in the Fifteenth Amendment;238 sex, in the Nineteenth Amendment;239 and 
age, in the Twenty-Sixth Amendment240), which augments Congress’s authority 
to break down gender disparities. 
III. THE SUPREME COURT’S FEDERALISM JURISPRUDENCE AND THE THIN VERSION OF 
CONGRESS’S NINETEENTH AMENDMENT ENFORCEMENT POWER 
This Part applies the Court’s current approach to congressional power (and in 
particular, congressional power to enforce constitutional provisions) to the 
Nineteenth Amendment. It highlights the myriad roadblocks that a thick concep-
tion of Congress’s Nineteenth Amendment enforcement power might encounter: 
(1) a state action limitation; (2) a congruence and proportionality requirement; 
(3) a limited definition of what constitutes discrimination “on account of sex”; 
and (4) other external obstacles, including the First Amendment. 
A. STATE ACTION 
The Nineteenth Amendment allows Congress to “enforce th[e] article,” and 
the substantive Article provides that, “The right of citizens of the United States to 
vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on 
account of sex.”241 The Court has interpreted similar language in the Fourteenth 
Amendment to mean that Congress can regulate only state action.242 Section 5 of 
the Fourteenth Amendment allows Congress to “enforce . . . th[e] article,” and 
the substantive Article provides that: 
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.243 
If Congress may reach only state action under its Nineteenth Amendment 
enforcement power, then Congress could not, for example, enact legislation 
addressing workplace-pay disparities or wealth gaps between men and women, 
even if those disparities contribute to political inequality of men and women; nor 
could Congress address sex stereotyping among private actors, even if they influ-
ence (or are influenced by) how the state treats women, or how the state regards 
burdens on women voting.244 
238. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1. 
239. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX, § 1. 
240. U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI, § 1. 
241. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX (emphasis added). 
242. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883). 
243. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §§ 1, 5 (emphasis added). 
244. There are, of course, difficult questions about what constitutes state action. In her Note on the 
Nineteenth Amendment, for example, Sarah Lawsky argued that marriage was a proper subject of 
regulation under the Nineteenth Amendment because marriage is a state-created institution. Sarah B. 
Lawsky, Note, A Nineteenth Amendment Defense of the Violence Against Women Act, 109 YALE L.J. 
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The idea that Congress may regulate only state action under the Fourteenth 
Amendment has its critics. Richard Primus has argued that the Court’s key state 
action decision, the Civil Rights Cases, was driven, in part, by racial resentment 
and antipathy toward legislation addressing racial discrimination, as well as the 
Court’s failure to appreciate how the Civil War and Reconstruction Amendments 
nullified elements of the constitutional order that disadvantaged African- 
Americans.245 That critique provides a powerful argument against modeling other 
constitutional rules on such a flawed decision.246 The Court has nonetheless stuck 
with the state action requirement, including when it struck down the Violence 
Against Women Act, which provided a civil remedy for victims of gender-based 
violence, as exceeding Congress’s powers under the Fourteenth Amendment.247 
And just last Term, the five conservative Justices described the state action 
requirement as a core component of liberty.248 
See Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck, 139 S. Ct. 1921, 1934 (2019). For criticism, see 
Genevieve Lakier, Manhattan Community Access Corp v. Halleck: Property Wins Out Over Speech on 
the Supposedly Free-Speech Court, AM. CONST. SOC’Y, https://www.acslaw.org/analysis/acs-supreme- 
court-review/manhattan-community-access-corp-v-halleck-property-wins-out-over-speech-on-the- 
supposedly-free-speech-court/ [https://perma.cc/MX72-Z8GB]. 
Given the similarities in the language between the Fourteenth and Nineteenth 
Amendments, it is extremely unlikely that the Court would permit Congress to 
regulate private actors under the Nineteenth Amendment. That is so despite some 
possible differences between the Fourteenth and Nineteenth Amendments. 
Consider, for example, that the Court’s reasoning in the Civil Rights Cases 
included the claim that a state action requirement was necessary to constrain 
Congress’s powers, because if Congress could regulate private parties under the 
Fourteenth Amendment, its powers would be considerably augmented.249 
Although the Court might have a similar concern with allowing Congress to regu-
late private conduct under the Nineteenth Amendment, part of the reason why the 
Court feared expansive congressional power under the Fourteenth Amendment 
was because the substantive provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment are so 
far-reaching.250 The substantive provisions in that Amendment guarantee equal 
protection, privileges and immunities, and due process of law. The substantive 
provision of the Nineteenth Amendment, by contrast, limits one ground for state 
differentiation (differentiation on the basis of sex), and the Amendment applies 
that limit to only some contexts (voting, politics, citizenship, or perhaps 
783, 808–15 (2000). Lawsky extended that argument to mean that Congress could also regulate on 
topics of state criminal law, such as gender-based violence, because those, too, are state-created or 
enabled institutions. Id. at 815. 
245. See Richard A. Primus, The Riddle of Hiram Revels, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1681, 1724–30 (2006). 
246. Primus also notes that the Court’s reasoning rested on a misguided analogy between the 
Fourteenth Amendment and the Contracts Clause: The Court maintained that the Fourteenth 
Amendment, like the Contracts Clause, was applicable only to the states. See The Civil Rights Cases, 
109 U.S. at 12–13. But this analogy overlooked that the Fourteenth Amendment contains a grant of 
power to Congress whereas the Contracts Clause does not. Primus, supra note 245, at 1720. 
247. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 621–27 (2000). 
248. 
249. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 13–15. 
250. See id. at 14–15. 
64 THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 108:27 
something else). Even if the areas that fall within the ambit of the substantive pro-
vision of the Nineteenth Amendment go beyond voting, they are still narrower 
than the set of areas that fall within the ambit of the substantive provisions of the 
Fourteenth Amendment—which the Court understood to reach essentially every 
aspect of life.251 
B. CONGRUENCE AND PROPORTIONALITY 
Another limitation on Congress’s Nineteenth Amendment enforcement power 
would also be drawn from a limitation on Congress’s Fourteenth Amendment 
enforcement powers: the congruence and proportionality requirement. In City of 
Boerne v. Flores, the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment allows 
Congress to enact legislation that is “congruen[t] and proportional[]” to a pattern 
of constitutional violations.252 In doing so, the Court required there to be a closer 
fit between a law’s means and ends when Congress legislates under Section 5 of 
the Fourteenth Amendment than when it legislates under Article I.253 And, the 
Court declared, Congress’s powers under Section 5 are only remedial; Congress 
cannot define or create new constitutional rights.254 
A congruence and proportionality limitation, like a state action requirement, 
would prevent Congress from addressing many aspects of sex discrimination. It 
would limit Congress’s ability to address sex discrimination among private actors 
(assuming Congress could regulate non-state actors at all). It would also limit 
Congress’s ability to address facially neutral laws or policies that have differen-
tial burdens on the basis of sex.255 The congruence and proportionality standard 
requires Congress to tie legislation to a pattern of constitutional violations.256 But 
many if not most facially neutral laws would be constitutional under existing doc-
trine; therefore, congressional legislation that prohibited those facially neutral 
laws might not be closely tied to or remedy a pattern of constitutional 
violations.257 
Like the state action requirement, the congruence and proportionality limit has 
been subject to considerable scholarly criticism. Michael McConnell, among 
others, has argued that the requirement misreads the drafting history of the 
251. See id.; see also City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 523, 529 (1997) (noting that an 
expansive interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment would make it “difficult to conceive of a 
principle that would limit congressional power”). 
252. See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520. 
253. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819); see also United States v. 
Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 130 (2010) (“[T]he Constitution grants Congress the authority to enact [laws 
which are] ‘necessary and proper for carrying into Execution’ the powers ‘vested by’ the ‘Constitution 
in the Government of the United States.’” (citing U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 18)). 
254. See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519. 
255. See, e.g., Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Md., 566 U.S. 30, 39 (2012); see also Evan H. 
Caminker, “Appropriate” Means-Ends Constraints on Section 5 Powers, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1127, 1153– 
58 (2001) (explaining the congruence and proportionality requirement of City of Boerne). 
256. E.g., Caminker, supra note 255, at 1153–58. 
257. See, e.g., Coleman, 566 U.S. at 39; Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 
(2001); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 67 (2000). 
2020] THIN AND THICK CONCEPTIONS OF THE 19TH AMENDMENT 65 
Fourteenth Amendment and ignores the basic reality that the Fourteenth 
Amendment drafters trusted Congress more than the courts.258 He concludes that 
it is therefore unlikely that the framers would have limited Congress’s powers 
and tied Congress’s powers to judicial interpretations of the Constitution.259 
Doug Laycock has mounted a similarly forceful critique.260 
There are, again, some possible distinctions between the Fourteenth and 
Nineteenth Amendments that are also based on the text and histories of the two 
Amendments, such that the congruence and proportionality requirement might 
apply to the former but not the latter. The textual differences between the two 
Amendments are similar to those that might justify treating the two Amendments 
differently for purposes of the state action requirement. Specifically, City of 
Boerne v. Flores justified the congruence and proportionality requirement in part 
by pointing to the otherwise expansive reach of Congress’s powers under the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Those powers would be expansive, City of Boerne rea-
soned, because of the expansive reach of the substantive provisions of the 
Article: If Congress could enact legislation that was merely somewhat related to 
a list of far-reaching substantive protections, then Congress’s powers would be 
significantly expanded.261 These concerns are less potent in the context of the 
Nineteenth Amendment, whose substantive provision, the preceding section 
explained, is narrower than the substantive provisions of the Fourteenth 
Amendment (even if the substantive provision of the Nineteenth Amendment is 
interpreted to apply outside the specific context of voting).262 
Nonetheless, there will still be concerns about allowing Congress to regulate in 
areas of traditional state concern, which is where a thick conception of 
Congress’s enforcement power would likely lead, given that vestiges of sex dis-
crimination remain in criminal law, family law, and morals legislation, among 
other areas.263 Moreover, the core textual basis for City of Boerne’s congruence 
and proportionality requirement applies equally to both the Nineteenth and 
Fourteenth Amendments. City of Boerne reasoned that Congress could enact laws 
that are congruent and proportional to a pattern of constitutional violations 
because the Fourteenth Amendment gave Congress remedial, rather than substan-
tive, powers by permitting Congress to “enforce” the provisions of the Article.264 
Given that the Nineteenth Amendment also grants Congress the power to enforce 
the provisions of the Article, it is likely the Court would say that the Nineteenth 
258. See, e.g., McConnell, supra note 168, at 181–83. 
259. Id. 
260. See Douglas Laycock, Conceptual Gulfs in City of Boerne v. Flores, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
743, 766–67 (1998). 
261. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 523, 529. 
262. See Caminker, supra note 255, at 1191 & n.269, 1197–98 (outlining this argument with respect 
to the Fifteenth Amendment). 
263. Cf. Siegel, supra note 22, at 1022–24 (arguing that Congress can regulate these areas under the 
Nineteenth Amendment). 
264. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520–29. 
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Amendment also requires Congress to enact laws that are congruent and propor-
tional to a pattern of constitutional violations. 
There are also some possible historical differences between the Fourteenth and 
Nineteenth Amendments that are relevant to whether the congruence and propor-
tionality standard applies to both Amendments. Boerne relied on the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s drafting history and, specifically, Congress’s rejection of a provi-
sion that would have allowed Congress to enact all laws necessary and proper to 
secure the Amendment.265 But the drafting history of the Nineteenth Amendment 
suggests Congress attempted to expand the scope of Congress’s enforcement 
authority, rather than constrict it. After some members of the House warned that 
the Nineteenth Amendment’s Enforcement Clause “gives to Congress the full, 
absolute, unrestricted, and exclusive power” over elections,266 the Senate consid-
ered and rejected an amendment that would have replaced the Enforcement 
Clause with the following: 
That the several States shall have the authority to enforce this article by neces-
sary legislation, but if any State shall enforce or enact any laws in conflict 
therewith, then Congress shall not be excluded from enacting appropriate 
legislation to enforce it.267 
Congress, however, elected to keep the broader Enforcement Clause. Equally 
important is that when Congress selected the Nineteenth Amendment 
Enforcement Clause, it had before it some evidence that the language of the 
Enforcement Clause allowed Congress to legislate far beyond the substantive 
provisions of the Amendment. (The Court did not announce the congruence and 
proportionality requirement until 1997.) When Congress picked the Enforcement 
Clause language in the Nineteenth Amendment, Congress had exercised its 
authority under the analogous Enforcement Clause of the Eighteenth Amendment 
to enact laws that extended well beyond the substantive provisions of the 
Eighteenth Amendment. The Eighteenth Amendment prohibited only “the manu-
facture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors within, the importation 
thereof into, or the exportation thereof from the United States and all territory 
subject to the jurisdiction thereof for beverage purposes.”268 But relying on the 
Eighteenth Amendment’s Enforcement Clause, Congress had enacted legislation 
prohibiting the simple possession of liquor.269 Congress had also prohibited non- 
intoxicating liquors and regulated alcohol that was not used for beverage 
purposes.270 
265. Id. at 520–21. For a critique of the Court’s historical analysis on Boerne, see McConnell, supra 
note 168. 
266. 58 CONG. REC. 90 (1919) (statement of Rep. Clark). 
267. Id. at 634 (text of amendment proposed by Sen. Gay). 
268. U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, § 1, repealed by U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 1. 
269. National Prohibition Act, ch. 85, §§ 3, 25, 41 Stat. 307, 308, 315 (1919). 
270. Id. §§ 1, 4–13, 41 Stat. at 307–12. 
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A Court committed to grafting a congruence and proportionality requirement 
onto the Nineteenth Amendment might point to the only legislation that Congress 
ever proposed pursuant to its enforcement power under the Amendment. That 
legislation provided for a cause of action against officials who violated the sub-
stantive provisions of the Amendment by prohibiting women from casting votes 
because they were women.271 That legislation is certainly consistent with a nar-
row conception of Congress’s enforcement power that allows Congress only to 
remedy constitutional violations, but it does not prove that supplying a remedy 
against unconstitutional conduct exhausts the full scope of Congress’s enforce-
ment power under the Nineteenth Amendment. 
C. “ON ACCOUNT OF” SEX 
The scope of Congress’s enforcement power also depends on what it means for 
a law or policy to be “on account of sex.” This section outlines two related issues 
about interpreting the phrase “on account of sex” that will affect the scope of 
Congress’s enforcement powers. The first is whether “on account of sex” refers 
to restrictions that intentionally discriminate on the basis of sex versus restrictions 
that have the effect of discriminating on the basis of sex; the second is whether 
“on account of sex” encompasses restrictions that differentially affect transgender 
or nonbinary individuals. 
1. Intent Versus Effects 
We assume, consistent with the Court’s equal protection doctrine, that voting 
restrictions that explicitly include a reference to sex (or whose application turns 
on a reference to sex) are on account of sex.272 In addition to laws that are explic-
itly sex-based, some facially neutral laws will also discriminate on account of 
sex, and there are at least two different accounts of what it means for a facially 
neutral voting restriction to be on account of sex. One is that a facially neutral 
restriction is on account of sex if the restriction intentionally seeks to treat people 
differently because of their sex.273 The other is that a voting restriction is on 
account of sex when it has the effect of producing differential burdens on certain 
groups of people on the basis of sex.274 
If on account of sex refers only to those laws that explicitly mention sex or 
intentionally target people because of their sex, then Congress’s enforcement 
power would be considerably narrower than if on account of sex encompassed 
laws that produced disparate effects. This is particularly true if, as we expect, the 
current Court would read a congruence and proportionality requirement into the 
271. S. 4739, 66th Cong. § 2 (1920); H.R. 15018, 66th Cong. § 2 (1920); S. 4323, 66th Cong. § 2 
(1920). 
272. See Reva B. Siegel, From Colorblindness to Antibalkanization: An Emerging Ground of 
Decision in Race Equality Cases, 120 YALE L.J. 1278, 1286–88 (2011) (defining the “anticlassification” 
principle). 
273. Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 257, 275 (1979). 
274. See Siegel, supra note 272, at 1288 (explaining how “facially neutral” policies can have a 
“disparate impact on minorities”). 
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Nineteenth Amendment.275 If on account of sex includes only laws that purpose-
fully differentiate between sexes, then it would be harder for Congress to address 
laws that impose differential burdens on the different sexes, because federal legis-
lation targeting those laws would not be as closely tied to a pattern of constitu-
tional violations. 
We believe that a discriminatory effect standard is a better way to judge 
Nineteenth Amendment violations.276 But the Supreme Court’s 1980 decision in 
City of Mobile v. Bolden imposed a purpose requirement on Fourteenth and 
Fifteenth Amendment claims of racially discriminatory voting,277 and the Court 
has adopted an increasingly restrictive account about what it means to discrimi-
nate based on certain characteristics.278 The Court is therefore likely to adopt a 
discriminatory purpose standard, which would further narrow the scope of 
Congress’s enforcement authority. Further evidence of this is that the Court has 
(remarkably) ruled that discrimination on the basis of pregnancy does not consti-
tute discrimination on the basis of sex,279 and it also has concluded that a state 
rule preferencing a group that was over 98% male does not constitute intentional 
discrimination on the basis of sex.280 As scholars have noted, the Court has 
adopted demanding rules about the kind of evidence required to establish inten-
tional discrimination (circumstantial evidence is often not enough) and has relied 
on a very narrow definition about what constitutes intentional discrimination (fo-
cusing on whether decisionmakers desire to hurt a particular group).281 A narrow 
definition of “on account of sex” would limit Congress’s enforcement power, par-
ticularly in conjunction with a congruence and proportionality requirement. 
2. Gender Identity 
The phrase “on account of sex” is most commonly understood to refer to dis-
tinctions between men and women. But linguistically and conceptually, it might 
also refer to burdens that fall on transgender or nonbinary individuals. If these 
laws are considered voting abridgments on account of sex, then Congress’s 
enforcement authority could include legislation protecting the voting rights and 
political rights of transgender individuals. 
Consider how voter-identification requirements or voter-roll maintenance 
systems might burden transgender individuals. These laws might result in the dis-
enfranchisement of transgender individuals if state-recognized forms of 
275. However, under certain conceptions of Congress’s enforcement power, Congress could either 
disagree with judges’ conclusions that particular laws intentionally target individuals because of their 
sex, or disagree that the substantive principle embodied in the Nineteenth Amendment prohibits only 
intentional discrimination. See supra notes 158–61 and accompanying text. 
276. At least, we do not believe that discriminatory purpose is always required to establish a 
constitutional violation. This Part, however, is focused on what the Court is likely to do. 
277. 446 U.S. 55, 61–64 (1980); see also Reno v. Bossier Par. Sch. Bd., 528 U.S. 320, 334 n.3 
(noting that the Court had never held that vote dilution violates the Fifteenth Amendment). 
278. Jessica A. Clarke, Explicit Bias, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 505, 523–40 (2018). 
279. See Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 494–95 (1974). 
280. Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 257, 275 (1979). 
281. See, e.g., Clarke, supra note 278, at 523–40. 
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identification do not reflect an individual’s identified or expressed gender—such 
as where an individual starts to live consistently with their gender identity, which 
does not correspond with their sex assigned at birth, or where an individual does 
not identify as gender binary.282 An individual who changes one method of identi-
fication runs the risk that database matching will turn up other records that have 
not been updated; and the burden of updating one’s state identification is itself an 
additional barrier to voting that falls on the genderqueer community.283 
These distinctions and burdens are sex-based in at least one respect—they neces-
sarily depend on an individual’s sex assigned at birth.284 If a transgender man was 
assigned male sex at birth, then the voting-identification requirements or database 
matching would not have been an obstacle to him. But because he was assigned 
female sex at birth, they are. The resulting burden is therefore on account of sex. 
If on account of sex encompasses regulations whose operation is contingent on 
or depends on an individual’s sex, then burdens that fall on the genderqueer com-
munity might fall within the set of restrictions that Congress can eliminate in the 
course of enforcing the Nineteenth Amendment.285 
D. EXTERNAL CONSTRAINTS 
Finally, legislation attempting to enforce the Nineteenth Amendment might en-
counter a variety of obstacles external to the Nineteenth Amendment. The Court 
has been generally skeptical of legislation designed to remedy inequities and 
enforce civil rights. For example, the Court invalidated section 4 of the Voting 
Rights Act on the basis of the “equal sovereignty principle,”—a free-floating 
principle that is not based in the constitutional text and lacks a serious historical 
foundation or roots in the constitutional structure.286 
The First Amendment may prove to be another obstacle to some of the legisla-
tion discussed in the previous Part. In particular, some of the laws designed to 
counter wealth-based disparities in the political process are likely inconsistent 
with the Court’s current interpretation of the First Amendment.287 In Citizens 
282. See Kolbert, supra note 74, at 513–14. 
283. See id. 
284. They may also embody a form of sex stereotyping. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 
228, 250 (1989). 
285. This term, the Court is expected to decide a pair of cases that shed some light on how it might 
interpret the Nineteenth Amendment. In EEOC v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Homes, Inc., 884 F.3d 560 (6th 
Cir. 2018), cert. granted in part, 139 S. Ct. 1599 (2019) (mem.), and argued No. 18-107 (Oct. 8, 2019), 
and Bostock v. Clayton County Board of Commissioners, 723 F. App’x 964 (11th Cir. 2018), cert. 
granted, 139 S. Ct. 1599 (2019) (mem.), and argued No. 17-1618 (Oct. 8, 2019) (consolidated with 
Altitude Express, Inc. v. Zarda, No. 17-1623), the Court is considering whether, for purposes of Title 
VII, discrimination against members of the transgender community or against gays, lesbians, and 
bisexuals constitutes discrimination on the basis of sex. The plaintiffs in the cases argue that it does 
because any such differential treatment is contingent on an individual’s sex assigned at birth (or their 
partner’s sex assigned at birth). The employers, on the other hand, are relying more on the fact that the 
enacting Congress did not expect the prohibition against discrimination on the basis of sex to encompass 
legal protections for the LGBTQ community. 
286. See Litman, supra note 19, at 1209–19. 
287. See Hasen, supra note 223, at 307; Hasen, supra note 216, at 574–75. 
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United v. FEC, the Court rejected the argument that restricting corporate spend-
ing in politics could be justified on the ground that the restrictions protected polit-
ical equality (given that some individuals have the resources to make 
contributions through different mediums, including corporations).288 Previously, 
the Court had allowed Congress to restrict these expenditures in order to limit 
the “distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth” accumulated with the 
help of the corporate form.289 The sex-based-disparity rationale for some of the 
hypothetical legislation discussed in the previous part resembles this justification 
insofar as its goal is to offset resource and wealth advantages (or other political 
advantages) that are, in part, the product of sex discrimination. And some of the 
legislative means to accomplish that objective—in particular, restricting cam-
paign contributions—would implicate the First Amendment’s protections for 
speech.290 Others, like public funding for elections, would not.291 
CONCLUSION 
One view of the Nineteenth Amendment is that it is a remarkable story of con-
stitutional success. After the Amendment’s ratification, few states passed laws 
discriminating on the basis of sex in voting, meaning there was little need for liti-
gation or for congressional enforcement against state voting laws. 
Our view is more measured. We view the Nineteenth Amendment as partially 
successful in ending the most blatant discriminatory voting practices against 
most white women. But it took the Civil Rights Movement of the 1960s and the 
passage of the 1965 Voting Rights Act to fully grant the franchise to all women. 
We also think the current thin understanding of the Nineteenth Amendment fails 
for lack of imagination about the scope of its promise. 
Courts have interpreted the Nineteenth Amendment to do very little, at least of 
its own force, in part because the Nineteenth Amendment was ratified at a 
moment when the march toward women’s equality was very much unfinished 
and was still hamstrung by the racial ideologies of the first part of the twentieth 
century. When the Amendment was ratified, women were still treated as second- 
class citizens—not capable of participating in all aspects of public life, as unfit to 
work, and as natural caretakers, which kept them out of many parts of civil life.292 
288. 558 U.S. 310, 356–61 (2010). 
289. Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990), overruled by Citizens 
United, 558 U.S. 310. 
290. See generally McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185 (2014); Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310. 
291. See Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom PAC v. Bennett, 564 U.S. 721, 722 (2011) (striking down, 
under the First Amendment, a provision of Arizona’s public-financing system that provided extra 
financing to participating candidates who faced large spending by opponents or outside groups). 
292. See, e.g., 52 CONG. REC. 1443 (statement of Rep. Brown) (arguing that Nineteenth Amendment 
would not displace generally accepted poll taxes or educational tests); id. at 1408–09 (statement of Rep. 
Campbell) (arguing that women would use the vote to reflect their traditional place in the home); id. at 
1413–14 (statement of Rep. Clark) (same); Ellen Carol DuBois, Outgrowing the Compact of the 
Fathers: Equal Rights, Woman Suffrage, and the United States Constitution, 1820–1878, 74 J. AM. 
HIST. 836, 862 (1987); McCammon & Campbell, supra note 214, 59–69 (describing resistance to 
implementing the Nineteenth Amendment in several states). 
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Those shared beliefs probably informed judicial interpretations of the Nineteenth 
Amendment. But they were also built into the narrow scope of the substantive pro-
tections in the Nineteenth Amendment—the substantive provision is aimed only at 
voting, rather than all measures of citizenship, political equality, and public life. 
Although some proponents of women’s suffrage surely wanted (and some critics 
undoubtedly feared) the Amendment would effect a radical reshaping of women’s 
lives and sex equality, the reality is that it has had far more tepid results. 
Subsequent Congresses and later body politics need not be limited by those same 
regressive intuitions. By delegating to Congress (including all future Congresses) 
the power to play a role in the effectuation of the Nineteenth Amendment, the 
Enforcement Clause invites future legislatures to shed the impulses that may have 
contributed to a more restrictive substantive provision and to more restrictive judi-
cial interpretations of that substantive provision. Congressional enforcement is a 
mechanism—indeed, the mechanism—to move beyond the ideas and principles that 
contributed to such a narrow account of the Nineteenth Amendment. That is part of 
the problem with the fact that the current Court is so skeptical of congressional 
enforcement and so wedded to a notion of judicial supremacy.293 
A thicker and more robust Nineteenth Amendment, viewed in light of other 
constitutional amendments expanding voting rights and giving Congress the 
prime tool to enforce these amendments, gives ample room for eliminating many 
remaining voting and political-power disparities that continue to exist a century 
after ratification.294 
Acceptance of the ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment, which provides that “Equality of 
rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of 
sex,” would considerably strengthen these arguments. Frequently Asked Questions, ERA, https://www. 
equalrightsamendment.org/faq [https://perma.cc/Z7H5-MKK6] (last visited Apr. 5, 2020). 
Congress passed the Amendment in 1972 and, at the time of this Article, enough states had ratified the 
Amendment, but not within the time limit originally set by Congress. Litigation over the Amendment’s 
ratification has begun. Sarah Rankin & Michelle L. Price, Democratic AGs Sue to Force U.S. to Adopt 
ERA in Constitution, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Jan. 30, 2020), https://apnews.com/4913397a57f671c62 
989a1a5ec10df17 [https://perma.cc/MZ4U-HWG7]. 
The full scope of the effect of ratification on the voting rights claims advanced here is well beyond the 
scope of this Article. But accepted ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment would bolster a twenty- 
first century synthetic reading of the Nineteenth Amendment as part of a contemporary franchise- 
extending and rights-extending U.S. Constitution. 
Courts should read congressional power broadly to protect 
women’s political and voting rights. And given the synthetic reading of the 
Constitution that points to a constitutional commitment to enhanced voting rights, 
courts should be especially skeptical of state laws—and especially deferential to 
federal legislation targeting state laws—that infringe upon the rights of groups of 
voters who enjoy multiple voting protections in the Constitution such as younger, 
female voters of color. As Justice Ginsburg reminded us in her 2013 Shelby 
County dissent: “Under our constitutional structure, Congress holds the lead rein 
in making the right to vote equally real for all U.S. citizens.”295 It is time for 
Congress to take that rein.  
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295. Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 567 n.2 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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